

DEFENSE OF THE KANSAS FRONTIER
AGAINST INDIANS AND OUTLAWS 1864-1869


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
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CHAPTER I

THE MILITARY POST AS A FACTOR IN THE
FRONTIER DEFENSE OF KANSAS, 1865-1869

The name "fort" is perhaps a misnomer when applied to the military posts of the western frontier during the sixties. No huge, grim structure of defense, which usually is associated with the name fort, was ever erected on the western border. Nor did the western fort usually possess a stockade or blockhouse for defensive purposes. Officers' quarters, soldiers' barracks, stables, military storehouses and headquarters buildings, grouped around a trim parade ground, constituted the frontier fort. While no doubt a disappointment to many of its critics the military post of the Middle West admirably fulfilled the purposes for which it was constructed, i. e., the keeping open of lines of travel and communication and the protection of outlying settlements.

Forts were located without any definite prearranged plan. A military necessity for a post at a certain point determined that the post should be there established.¹ During the Civil War and in the period immediately following, increased Indian activity on the plains caused an expansion in the total number of frontier posts. In 1860

there were seventy-three army posts on the frontier, four located in Kansas. These forts had an average garrison of 180 men. By 1864 the number of forts had increased to 101. Kansas, in the meantime, had had its quota raised to five. In 1867 the American frontier possessed 116 posts with an average of 212 men per post. This was the high mark in frontier garrisons. By 1870 the number of posts had decreased to 111 with an average garrison of 205 men.

Army forts were of two types: The permanent fort, and the temporary outpost or camp. The former was built as a definite protection to some route of travel or communication and was in service for years, whereas the latter usually was operated for only a few weeks or months as military needs determined.

Nearly all the permanent military establishments within the State of Kansas were built to serve as guardians of the great highways to Colorado and New Mexico. The Santa Fe Trail was defended by three of these: Forts Zarah, Larned and Dodge; while Forts Riley, Harker, Hays and Wallace stood guard over the Smoky Hill route to Denver. Fort Leavenworth, father of all the Kansas military posts, stood at the head of both these famous trails, in addition to being connected with the Platte Trail to California and Oregon. Of the major forts, Fort Scott alone remained aloof from the busy thoroughfares to the West.

Kansas was defended during the sixties by two types of

forts: the United States army posts of both classes, garrisoned by army regulars, and the local defensive fort, which sprang up to meet some sectional emergency and was usually garrisoned by state militia, although sometimes merely by local settlers. A map of Kansas in 1868 indicated eight United States army posts within the boundaries of the State.³ A ninth, Fort Wallace, was also in service although not shown on the map. The following United States army posts were denoted: Fort Leavenworth in Leavenworth County, Fort Scott in Bourbon County, Fort Riley in Riley County (now in Geary County), Fort Ellsworth (Harker) in Ellsworth County, Fort Zarah in Barton County, Fort Larned in Pawnee County, Fort Hays in Ellis County and Downers Station in Trego County. The last was a temporary outpost; the first seven were permanent structures.

To give a clear notion of the extent of frontier defense in pioneer Kansas it is necessary to do more than merely name the United States army posts. To do justice to the subject not only must each of these major military defenses be located and a brief history of each given, but mention must be made of the more important temporary camps or stations of the regular army as well as the local fortresses of the settlers. It would also be illogical to overlook those army posts located adjacent to but outside of Kansas. These materially aided in the State's defense. The following study, therefore, will concern itself with each

class of fortifications in the order named: (1) Permanent United States army forts in Kansas; (2) temporary United States army camps or stations in Kansas; (3) local defensive forts in Kansas; (4) permanent United States army forts adjacent to, but outside of Kansas.

Fort Leavenworth was the first permanent United States army fort established in Kansas. It was founded by Colonel Henry Leavenworth in 1827. From that date until well in the 70's this fort on the Missouri served as the chief unit in the system of frontier defense. In the fifties and sixties it was the general depot from which supplies were sent to all the United States military posts, camps and forts in the Great West.⁴ Here the military commanders of the department of Missouri, of which Kansas was a part, made their headquarters. With only a few exceptions Leavenworth remained the department headquarters. When necessity demanded the department commander shifted to the other forts within his department. For example, General Sheridan moved his headquarters to Fort Hays in 1868 and later to Camp Supply in Indian Territory. During the winter of 1869-1870 General Schofield was forced to remove the department offices to St. Louis in order to make room at Fort Leavenworth for the Seventh Cavalry, which had been on the plains the previous year.⁵ The importance of Fort Leavenworth is demonstrated by the fact that General Sterling Price made it one of the objectives in his famous raid of 1864.

Fort Scott was established four miles west of the Missouri line in east central Kansas in 1842. Because of its location it never was a factor in the frontier defense of the State against the Indians in the sixties; although for a short time in 1865 garrisons stationed in the town patrolled the eastern border of the State as a protection⁶ against possible bushwhacker invasion from Missouri.

Fort Riley was established in 1853 on the north bank of the Kansas river at the junction of the Smoky Hill and Republican forks. Since it was closer to the area of Indian troubles it soon became the point of departure for most of⁷ the mounted expeditions against the hostile tribes. During the great Indian wars of the sixties, however, the forts farther to the west and south became the starting points for expeditions against the Indians. Fort Riley's chief function during that period became one of organizing and drilling troops and as headquarters for military supplies. Here the famous Seventh Cavalry was organized in the fall of 1866. The fort held a unique position in the military organization of the nation, being listed in army records as⁸ an independent post.

Of the guardians of the Santa Fe trail in Kansas during the sixties, Fort Larned was the oldest and most important. Established in 1859 as the "Camp on Pawnee Fork", its history dates back further than that of either Forts Dodge or Zarah. On February 1, 1860, the place was rechristened Camp Alert,

and later in the year received its permanent name, Fort Larned. The fort was located on the bank of the Pawnee Fork about eight miles west of its junction with the Arkansas River near the present town of Larned. Fort Larned's principal usefulness was as a headquarters for military forces detailed to guard traffic along the trail. It also served as an agency and gathering place for the plains tribes. When a rumor reached Kansas in 1872 that General Pope proposed to discontinue Fort Larned as a military post Governor Harvey protested vigorously, stating that the people of South-central Kansas, and especially the workmen engaged in constructing the Santa Fe Railroad, needed the fort as a protection against the Indians. Accordingly the fort was not abandoned until 1878.

Fort Zarah, located northeast of Fort Larned on Walnut Creek about one mile from its confluence with the Arkansas, was established by General S. R. Curtis in 1864 and named in honor of his son. Fort Zarah aided materially in the guarding of the Santa Fe Trail, escorts being constantly employed to accompany trains west to Smoky Crossing between Zarah and Larned and east for twenty-five miles toward Council Grove. The post was abandoned in December, 1869.

Fort Dodge, the most westerly of the big forts along the Trail in Kansas, was established in 1864 by Major General Grenville M. Dodge. The post was near the intersection of the dry and wet routes of the Santa Fe Trail. It lay

between the two points where the Indians most frequently crossed the Arkansas--the Cimarron Crossing, twenty-five miles west, and Mulberry Creek Crossing, fifteen miles east. It attained its greatest importance during the latter part of 1868, when it was used for a time by General Sheridan as headquarters for his famous winter campaign against the Indians in Indian Territory and Texas.¹³

That the locality near Fort Dodge was of strategic importance in guarding the Trail is evidenced by the fact that several other forts preceded it in the region. The earliest of these was Fort Mann, established in 1845 near the Cimarron Crossing and abandoned in 1850.¹⁴ While Fort Mann was in its prime another post called Fort Mackay was located farther to the east. The exact date of its establishment and abandonment are unknown. In 1850 Fort Atkinson¹⁵ was established, and was abandoned in 1854. It was near the site of Fort Atkinson that Fort Dodge was later established.

In 1864 and 1865 a chain of forts extended along the Smoky Hill Valley through which ran the Butterfield Overland Dispatch from Leavenworth and Atchison to Denver. Forts Harker, Wallace and Hays were built in the order named to guard this short cut to Denver which passed through the most Indian-infested region in Kansas.

Fort Harker, originally Fort Ellsworth, was built in 1864 near the present town of Ellsworth, thirty-six miles

west of Salina. It was located on the Smoky Hill River at the crossing of the old Santa Fe Stage Road.¹⁶ A brief description of it is given by the traveler, Bell, who refers to it as a "well-built, three-company post, with spacious store-houses filled with munitions of war", but like all these military establishments, carrying out in no particular¹⁷ the term fort.

During its active career of nine years Fort Harker proved to be a bulwark of defense against the hostile Indians. It was one of the strongest, if not the strongest, of the western Kansas forts and effectively protected the town of Salina from Indian incursions.¹⁸ When General Polk, commander of the Department of the Missouri, was considering the abandonment of Fort Harker in 1871, the Kansas legislature on February 16, passed a joint resolution of protest to the government. The legislature gave as reasons, first that Fort Harker was essential to the defense of the North-central Kansas frontier, and second, that it would be a great financial loss, since the buildings cost the United States \$1,000,000 and would sell under the hammer for about \$25,000.¹⁹ The government finally abandoned the Fort in 1873.

Forts Hays and Wallace came into existence at approximately the same time, Wallace being constructed in September while Hays was established in October of 1865.

Fort Hays was known as Fort Fletcher until November 11,

1866. It was located on the line of the proposed Kansas Pacific Railroad near the site of the present city of Hays. Like all the forts on the Kansas Pacific line, Hays contributed much toward protecting construction camps along the road and keeping open the Smoky Hill route. In the Indian wars of 1867 it was headquarters for General Hancock during part of his campaign. Again in 1868 General Sheridan made²⁰ Fort Hays the headquarters for his campaign. This honor must be shared, however, with Fort Dodge and Camp Supply. The famous Seventh Cavalry, under Colonel George A. Custer, was quartered at Hays from 1867 to 1870, and the Nineteenth²¹ Kansas Cavalry was mustered-out there in the spring of 1869. The Fort was abandoned by the government in 1889.

Fort Wallace was first called Camp Pond Creek. It was located near the western boundary of Kansas on Pond Creek, a tributary to the Smoky Hill. Wallace was the last and most western military post of any permanency in Kansas. From 1865 to 1878 it bore the brunt of the contest with the²² Indian tribes. Its functions were similar to those of Forts Hays and Harker, with the exception that the latter were larger and were more often selected as headquarters for large expeditions against the Indians. That Fort Wallace was unusually active in frontier protection cannot be doubted, however. There is little evidence to refute the following statement concerning the importance of the Fort:

"It is very evident after checking up the

assignments of troops and engagements between the Indians and the military in Kansas, that the small garrisons at Fort Wallace participated in more actual engagements with the Indians and were sent to the relief of more scout and escort parties than the soldiers from any other post in Kansas. Other posts were bases of supplies and regimental headquarters where large forces were mobilized for Indian campaigns. But none defended a larger territory on the western frontier of Kansas. . . ."²³

Garrisons at Fort Wallace were usually low during the Indian wars of 1866-'69, since troops were constantly acting as escorts for railroad surveyors and laborers, stage coaches, wagon trains, and for government officials and quartermasters trains.²⁴

Notwithstanding the fact that these forts comprised the backbone of the frontier defense in Kansas they were ably assisted by smaller outposts and camps of a temporary nature. Among those graced with the dignity of the term "fort" were the posts of Aubrey, Downer, Monument, Ogallah, Kirwin and Lookout. Of the camps the most prominent was Camp Beecher.

Fort Aubrey was built to aid in the defense of the Santa Fe Trail during the Indian war of 1865. Its location was sixteen miles west of Choteau's Island on the Arkansas

River and approximately one hundred miles west of Fort Dodge by the wagon road and fifty miles east of Fort Lyon, Colorado. The site of the Fort is four miles east of the present town of Syracuse, Kansas. Fort Aubrey was established by Companies D and F of the Forty-eighth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry in September, 1865.²⁵ The Fort was abandoned April 15, 1866, during a lull in Indian activities along the Old Trail.

Fort Downer, an outpost on the Smoky Hill route to the Colorado gold fields, was located about fifty miles west of Fort Hays in Trego County. It was established as a stage station in 1865 and was a military post in 1867-'68.²⁶ The place was abandoned May 28, 1868. The post was used by General Custer as a base for Indian operations in Trego County in 1867. An eating station of the Butterfield Overland Dispatch, located at this point, was burned in 1867 by hostiles.²⁷

Fort Monument, or Fort Pyramid, was another outpost which was short lived. It was established in 1865 and abandoned in 1868. The Post was constructed in Gove County on the route of the Kansas Pacific Railroad between Forts Hays and Wallace near some monument-shaped rocks which gave the station its name. Although originally merely a station on the Butterfield Overland Dispatch it was soon found necessary to station troops there as a protection to the stage road. General Dodge in 1865 placed soldiers at this point

simultaneous with the garrisoning of Big Creek, Pond Creek,
²⁸
 and other B. O. D. Stations.

Trego County boasted of another defense besides Fort Downer. Camp Ogallah, on the Kansas Pacific Railroad about one mile west of Wakeeney, came into existence in 1867 or 1868. It protected the railroad builders during a most
²⁹
 hectic period of Indian depredations. According to one pioneer's version the camp's name was taken from the expression "O Golly"! A better explanation is that early settlers corrupted or mispronounced the name of the famous Ogallala
³⁰
 band of Dakota Indians and applied it to the Fort.

Camp Beecher, located in June, 1868, at the junction of the Little Arkansas and Big Arkansas Rivers, was a new unit in the defensive chain of forts in Kansas. It was built following the great Indian scare of 1868, when the Cheyennes raided the east-central portion of the State. The primary purpose of Camp Beecher was as headquarters for a border
³¹
 cavalry patrol which extended northward to Marion Center. During the Sheridan winter campaign of 1868-69 against the Indians, Camp Beecher was used as a supply station by the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry. The Camp was abandoned in October, 1869. Even as early as 1868 the camp site was referred
³²
 to as Wichita.

Somewhat different from that of other forts in Kansas is the history of Fort Kirwin. Built to meet the necessity

of frontier defense, it failed to meet that need and consequently was abandoned. The Fort was established in 1865 by Colonel Kirwin and a company of Tennessee volunteers who were sent to protect the Kansas frontier. The site chosen was near the confluence of Bow Creek with the North Solomon River in what is now Phillips County. Colonel John Kirwin, its builder, finding the country swarming with the hostile Indians, judiciously decided to vacate. There were no settlers needing protection within one hundred miles of the
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 Fort.

Another of the lesser fortifications was Fort Lookout, in Republic County. Situated upon a high bluff commanding the Republican River Valley, it guarded the military road from Fort Riley to Fort Kearney, Nebraska. Unlike the large military posts, it was constructed in the form of a block-house. This sturdy two-story log structure performed regular duty before 1868, when it was abandoned by the regular army. State militia used the building during the Indian war of 1868. Following their withdrawal the old Fort was used as a rendezvous for settlers of the White Rock and Republican
 34
 Valleys during the Indian scares of the early 70's.

Pioneer Kansas was well supplied with local fortifications to which the settlers could fly for refuge during the numerous Indian raids and scares of the 60's. Included in this group were Fort Montgomery at Eureka, Fort Brooks in Cloud County, Fort Solomon in Ottawa County, Fort Camp Jewell

on the site of present Jewell City, and two forts, names unknown, located in Mitchell and Republican Counties respectively.

At the beginning of the Civil War citizens of the Eureka neighborhood constructed Fort Montgomery as a fort for home guards. When they disbanded at the close of the War the Fort was occupied by a detachment of the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry. ³⁵ During the Indian scares of 1864-1869 it was used as a rallying place for settlers of Greenwood County.

Enterprising militia of Shirley County, later Cloud County, constructed Fort Brooks in August or September, 1864. Situated on the left bank of the Republican River the log blockhouse was headquarters for the local militia engaged in frontier defense. ³⁶

Fort Solomon in Ottawa County was a true frontier block house. Built early in 1864 as a defense against the Indians, it was the only shelter for the majority of the people of Ottawa County from the summer of 1864 to the spring of 1865. It consisted of log houses, arranged in the form of a square and enclosed with palisades. Fortunately for the settlers ³⁷ they were never forced to undergo a seige by Indians.

Home Guards of Jewell County were responsible for the construction of a sod fort in 1870 as a protection against the Indian raids, while Republic County in 1869 and Mitchell

County in 1867 each constructed an Indian defense. In May, 1869, nearly all the settlers on Salt and Reilly Creeks, in the Republican River region, left their claims and took refuge in a log fort in Belleville Township until a small body of militia was sent to their aid. The Mitchell County Fort was built by settlers in 1867 during the period of great Indian activity in Northwestern Kansas. Indian scares during that year greatly retarded immigration into the County.

In harmony with the home-guard movement during the Civil War, the state capital built a wooden stockade at the intersection of Sixth and Kansas Avenues. Although intended as a place of refuge against guerrillas, it was never forced to defend Topeka from invaders. Christened with the enlightening title of Fort Simple, its existence was never complex from its birth in 1863 to its final destruction by Topekans after the Civil War.

Kansas was not entirely defended by forts within her own boundaries. Since the Plains Indian roamed unwittingly over the state boundary lines it frequently happened that Indian depredations were broken up by soldiers stationed in the forts of the adjacent territories of Nebraska and Colorado.

Of these frontier watch dogs, Fort Kearney, Nebraska, was the most prominent. Located on the Platte River in

Southern Nebraska its jurisdiction often extended into
⁴⁰ Northern Kansas. From the time of its founding in 1848 this
 fort on the Platte Trail was the headquarters for nearly all
⁴¹ military operations in Nebraska.

Forts Cottonwood and Sedgwick also defended the Platte
 Trail and contributed to the defense of Kansas. The former,
 located at Cottonwood Springs, one hundred miles west of
 Fort Kearney, on the south bank of the Platte, proved of
 valuable assistance in keeping overland traffic going during
⁴² the Indian raids of 1864. Two years later the Fort's name
 was changed to McPherson. During the grand trek to the
 western mining country, Cottonwood Springs was an important
⁴³ supply depot for the miners.

Farther west on the Platte Trail, near Julesburg, Colo-
 rado, was a sod fort named Fort Dedgwick. It, too, was an
 important point since it was a depot of government supplies
 for a region extending fully one hundred and fifty miles
⁴⁴ along the South Platte.

South of Fort Sedgwick, on the Arkansas River, stood
 Fort Lyon. It was situated on the Santa Fe Trail about one
 hundred and fifty miles west of Fort Dodge. Known first as
 Bent's New Fort, from the time of its building in 1853 until
 1859 when it was leased to the government, it later adopted
⁴⁵ the title of Fort Wise and finally, in 1861, Fort Lyon.
 When it became necessary to relocate the Fort in 1867, it
 was renamed New Fort Lyon. In 1890, by act of congress,

the Fort was abandoned. The site of New Fort Lyon is near the present town of Las Animas, Colorado. Although principally engaged in protecting commerce and travel on the Santa Fe Trail, the troops of Fort Lyon participated in numerous Indian campaigns, chiefly that of Sheridan into Indian Territory in 1868-'69. Particularly fitting is the observation of a prominent traveler of the period concerning the military forts of the Frontier.

"Along the main lines of travel throughout the whole western country, at distances from sixty to three hundred miles apart, the United States government are obliged to maintain a great number of these military establishments . . . In many instances not a white man lives in the intervening country, and yet without⁴⁶ them overland travel would be impossible."

A brief explanation of the military organization of the Middle West following the Civil war will help to an understanding of references to posts and commanders.

The United States was divided into military divisions commanded by major generals of the army. The Middle West belonged to the military division of the Missouri, which was organized in 1865 by the War Department, to include the states of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois and the territories of Nebraska, Dakota, and Montana. Headquarters of the division was variously located at

St. Louis, Chicago, Omaha and Fort Leavenworth. The division was subdivided at the time of its organization into four geographical departments of the Dakota, the Platte, the Missouri, and the Arkansas.

The third of these, the Department of the Missouri, maintained permanent headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. This department was subdivided into four districts: the District of Kansas with headquarters also at Fort Leavenworth; the District of the Upper Arkansas whose headquarters was Fort Harker; the District of New Mexico, headquarters at Santa Fe; and the District of the Indian Territory, with head-⁴⁷quarters at Fort Gibson. Of these districts in the Department of the Missouri, the District of the Upper Arkansas was of the most interest to Kansans. Within its limits were Forts Dodge, Larned, Zarah, Wallace, Hays, Harker, and Lyons. Downer's Station, Monument Station and "End-of-Track", Union⁴⁸Pacific, Eastern Division, were also included.

From 1865 to 1869 the military division of the Missouri was commanded by Generals Pope, Sherman and Sheridan. In the order named. Department commanders changed even more frequently. The Department of the Missouri during this period was in charge of Generals Dodge in 1865-'66, Hancock in 1866-'67, Sheridan in 1868-'69 and Schofield in 1869. Prior to the organization of the military division of the Missouri, the State of Kansas made up three districts of the Department⁴⁹ of Kansas under the command of General S. R. Curtis.

In addition to the national military organization each state had its geographical departments for militia organization. Under a legislative act of February 13, 1865, Kansas was divided into four brigade districts with a brigadier general of militia in command of each district. The entire militia was then under the supervision of a major general commanding. General W. F. Cloud, of Leavenworth City, acted in the capacity of state commander from 1865-'67, when he was succeeded by General Harrison Kelley.

CHAPTER II

KANSAS AND THE BUSHWHACKERS

Guerrilla warfare, which menaced nearly every region in the Border States during the Civil War, was a constant danger to the young state of Kansas. This type of warfare was not a new experience to the citizens of the State, however. Bushwhacking had been going on intermittently ever since 1854. During the War it reached its peak, followed by a gradual decline in the ensuing years. Nevertheless, the fear created by bushwhacking marauders lingered on after their greatest activities had ceased.¹

Awful as the Quantrill raid on Lawrence actually was, the reality was no worse than the imaginary picture of future guerrilla incursions which was built up in the minds of the citizens of Kansas. Fear of Quantrill was responsible to a large extent for the development of the Kansas militia during the Civil War. It also was the cause for the springing up of numerous blockhouses and forts in the eastern part of the State. Fear and hatred of Quantrill motivated Governor Crawford of Kansas in seeking the arrest of the famous outlaw five years after his crime was committed.²

Bushwhacker depredations in Kansas burst forth again in 1864, culminating in the guerrilla outrages following the

Price Raid. As early as February of that year rumors began to spread concerning the presence of bushwhackers in Eastern Kansas. On February 27, General Curtis, commander of the Department of the Missouri at Fort Leavenworth, wrote to Governor Carney warning him that Dick Yager and five companions had gone west to attack the Santa Fe Trail. Scouts had reported that Yager, a notorious guerrilla chieftain, had been seen south of Lawrence. General Curtis recommended that the Kansas militia be put on its guard and stated that he would order the United States officer in command at Lawrence to "look after the rascals". Curtis also requested Carney to use his influence at Washington to bring about a strengthening of United States forces along the Eastern Kansas border.

During June and July, Kansas papers were full of news items in reference to conflicts between the military and the bushwhackers. Early in June, Colonel Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, received a notice of the presence of a nest of outlaws near Spring River. They were described as being half-breed Cherokees attired in Federal uniforms. In July occurred Colonel Ford's bushwhacker hunt in Missouri. The Colonel had been ordered forth from Fort Leavenworth to break up a band of guerrillas under the command of a certain Thornton. Ford succeeded in defeating Thornton and disintegrating his forces. Camden Point, a secession center in Platte County, Missouri was burned by the Union troops.

Another interesting newspaper item of 1864 related that many of the Indians who had been operating in the vicinity of Fort Larned had sandy colored hair and were apparently bushwhackers in disguise.⁵ This story is typical of numerous rumors which flew about Kansas during the Indian Wars of 1864-1869. Although Kansans constantly asserted that the Indians were being led by bushwhackers, there is little proof for such statements. It is possible that the few half-breeds who associated with the plains Indians were mistaken for Missouri desperadoes by their frightened victims.

In the fall of 1864, Sterling Price with his army of raiders invaded Missouri and threatened Eastern Kansas. Price recruited many guerrillas to bolster up his small army of regulars, having between two and three thousand volunteers and bushwhackers in his ranks.⁶ Following his defeat at Westport and subsequent retreat into Arkansas, bushwhacking members of his army spread a reign of terror throughout Western Missouri. Although the majority of their work was done in Missouri, the guerrillas succeeded in engulfing Eastern Kansas in a paralysis of fear. While no doubt imagination distorted the actual danger, the fact remains that small bands of desperadoes were roaming in the region making life miserable for honest citizens whether of Union or Confederate faith. The presence of a strong guard of United States troops along the Kansas border effectually prevented the bushwhackers from entering the State in any large numbers. Numerous Kansas militia, called out to repel Price

also aided in the defense against marauders.

State militia having been disbanded and many army regulars having been withdrawn from the eastern frontier, the spring of 1865 brought forth a renewed clamor for protection. John Speer, owner of the Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), put on an editorial campaign urging additional defense for the eastern border. ⁷ In an article entitled "Protection for Kansas", Mr. Speer approved Governor Crawford's course in asking for a regiment of cavalry for Indian service but pointed out that the greater danger to Kansas was not the Indian on the west but the bushwhacker on the east. No doubt Mr. Speer's residence in Lawrence had some influence in determining his point of view. In an editorial of February 16, the Lawrence editor called the attention of the department commander at Fort Leavenworth to the necessity of keeping an adequate force of regulars on the eastern border to protect Kansas from bushwhackers during the coming summer. The recent sacking of the town of Aubrey was cited as a warning of what was to happen unless active defensive steps were taken. It was also asserted that hundreds of deserters from Price's army were skulking in the region of Fort Scott waiting for the spring before renewing activities.

Before the year was half spent, bushwhacker depredations both real and fancied had increased until the Governor of Kansas took a hand to stop them. On May 12, Governor Crawford telegraphed Major General Dodge, department commander

at Fort Leavenworth, asking that the Seventh Kansas or some other good regiment be sent to the eastern border as a patrol.⁸ Simultaneously he asked General R. B. Mitchell of Fort Leavenworth to send three or four cavalry companies from Fort Scott up the border and into Missouri. The reason back of this request was stated by Crawford to be the concentration of bushwhackers in Missouri between Independence and Lexington.⁹ There is no evidence, however, to indicate that either General Dodge or General Mitchell complied with these requests.¹⁰

While Governor Crawford was seeking federal aid, the citizens of Lawrence were taking steps for their own protection. S. R. Thompson, captain of the Sixteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry and post commander at Lawrence, issued a proclamation on May 12, warning citizens of a threatened bushwhacker invasion.¹¹ The people were urged to organize a permanent picket along the Wakarusa River. The picket was organized and maintained for several weeks, but the threatened invasion failed to materialize. No further developments occurred until September when rumors reached Topeka concerning a contemplated raid into the east-central part of the State. Governor Crawford on September 10 wrote to Brigadier General J. T. Burris of Olathe informing him that bushwhackers and returned rebels were organizing in Missouri for a raid into Kansas. General Burris was instructed to post scouts along the border and to send one into Missouri to observe the activities of the plotters.¹² Like the invasion earlier in

the year this one did not occur. The year closed with "all quiet" on the eastern front.

Campaigning against bushwhackers in 1866 was begun by Governor Fletcher of Missouri, who on February 3 telegraphed Crawford asking him to use his influence on General Dodge in order that federal cavalry could be dispatched to Jackson County and adjoining Missouri counties. The cavalry was needed, according to Governor Fletcher, to assist Missouri sheriffs in arresting numerous bushwhackers and border ruffians. The Missouri executive closed his message with the significant words: "If this is not done, look out for your towns near the border. Bushwhackers are organizing for some purpose not yet known."¹³

In compliance with Fletcher's wishes, the Kansas governor sent General Dodge a report of bushwhacker activities in Missouri and suggested the stationing of cavalry on the border south of Kansas City.¹⁴ Crawford also notified General Dodge that a bushwhacker, charged with murder, was in jail at Lawrence. Fearing efforts at release of the criminal by his friends, the Governor urged that he be sent to the guard house at Fort Leavenworth and kept until court convened.¹⁵ General Dodge failed to fulfill either of these requests. Instead of accepting Crawford's suggestion concerning the captured bushwhacker he sent more troops to Lawrence to forestall any attempts at liberating the captive and raiding the town. This is revealed by two of Governor Crawford's

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 telegrams. On March 15, Crawford wrote to Fletcher asking for further information concerning bushwhacker organization in Western Missouri. That same day he wrote to Major E. J. Ross of Lawrence tendering him a commission as lieutenant colonel and aid de camp with instructions to quietly organize and equip the militia companies in and around Lawrence.¹⁷
 Crawford's motives for this action, as expressed in his instructions to Ross, were that the protection of the city should be adequately provided for without calling out the regular militia and without creating unnecessary alarm in the eastern part of the State.

Apparently realizing that he must seek the highest military authority, Crawford on March 15 telegraphed General Pope calling for a cavalry force to break up bushwhacker organization in Western Missouri.¹⁸ Pope replied the next day by refusing to send the troops to occupy any part of Missouri.¹⁹ He stated that it was injudicious to do so since outlaws were infesting all parts of the country alike. It is quite evident that Pope did not wish to set a precedent by providing federal aid in putting down local disturbances. That Crawford, before appealing to Pope, had again tried to persuade General Dodge to take action is indicated by a telegram from Dodge to Crawford dated March 21.²⁰ In this dispatch Dodge referred the Governor to General Pope, stating that under his orders he was prohibited from sending troops either to the border or to Lawrence.²¹

Not being able to obtain assistance from federal authorities, the Missouri and Kansas governors fell back upon the militia. Crawford, on March 16, wrote to General Burris at Olathe and informed him of Governor Fletcher's warning that sixty bushwhackers were located at Waverly on the Missouri River. Burris was ordered to see that the militia in his district was thoroughly organized and equipped and to keep posted on the movements of the bushwhackers. The letter closed with the statement that there was little danger to the State if each company and regiment of the militia were fully organized.²²

In view of this last statement by Crawford there seems to be little justification for his frantic appeal to Generals Dodge and Pope for federal assistance. That the bushwhackers in Missouri were organizing cannot be denied, but that they were a sufficient menace to warrant calling out United States troops should be seriously doubted. The facts are that in 1866 none of the rumored raids on Kansas ever materialized. Furthermore the militia preparations undertaken at Lawrence and along the eastern tier of counties proved adequate to meet the situation.

In the far southeastern part of the State, residents were bothered to some degree by marauders. Twenty-nine citizens of Baxter Springs, Cherokee County, on September 3 petitioned Governor Crawford to send two companies of militia to the vicinity to defend the county from a gang of

well armed desperadoes who were raiding in the immediate neighborhood. The petition asked for one company each of infantry and cavalry. While there is no direct evidence in the Crawford correspondence that this petition was answered, it is probable that the Governor met the situation by ordering the organization of the militia of Cherokee County.²³

With the close of 1866, bushwhacker depredations in Kansas and Missouri died away, never to be repeated upon such a large scale. While it is true that some local disturbances occurred in subsequent years, they were small in size and short in duration. The reign of the bushwhacker belonged exclusively to the lawless Civil War period and receded gradually with the return of law and order.

CHAPTER III

INDIAN WARS IN KANSAS AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES

1863-1865

Before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Plains Indian and the rapidly onrushing white invader had come to look upon each other as enemies. Each dimly recognized that a bitter contest for supremacy was some day going to take place. Had not the Civil War intervened, this gigantic racial struggle possibly would have occurred in the early Sixties instead of several years later. To the Plains Indian it mattered little whether a white man espoused the cause of Abraham Lincoln or Jefferson Davis. He recognized all white men as common enemies. The Comanche Indians will serve as an illustration. In Texas the members of this tribe raided the settlements of Confederates, while farther to the north in Kansas other Comanches were engaged in depredations upon the lives of Union men and women. The Plains Indian was too little concerned with the issues in the slavery struggle and too far away from the scene of action to have been an important factor in the War. Nevertheless, both North and South accused the other of having incited the fierce nomads of the Plains to attack their settlements. Especially was this accusation circulated in Kansas. Throughout the Civil War,

newspapers alleged that Confederate plotters were at work among the Plains tribes, especially the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.¹ Governor Crawford in his account has supported this contention.² It is true that George and Charlie Bent, half-breed Cheyenne sons of William Bent, the trader, joined the Confederate army at the beginning of the War. After being captured and parolled the boys returned to their home at Bent's Fort on the Arkansas. During the Cheyenne War of 1864-5 both of the Bent boys accompanied the Indians on their raids.³ Very probably this fact accounts for many of the stories of Confederate activity among the Indians.

In contrast to the number of rumors of collusion between Confederates and Indians, the actual attempts made by the Southerners were few. One of these, however, merits attention. In 1863 a group of Confederates was massacred by Osage Indians on the Verdigris River in Southeastern Kansas. Examination of the papers carried by the dead men revealed to Captain Doudna of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry the astounding fact that every one of the slain party was a commissioned officer. It was further disclosed that they were sent by General Kirby Smith as a commission to treat with the Indian tribes of the West and Southwest and incite them to war against the settlers of Kansas. Detailed plans of the Confederates provided that the officers were to divide up among the tribes and endeavor to secure their cooperation⁴ in the war of extermination which they planned to wage.

Since the plot failed it is idle to speculate as to what might otherwise have happened; nevertheless, it seems plausible to assert that the Commission stood a much better chance of losing their scalps at the hands of the Indians of the Plains than of succeeding in their scheme against the Union.

In 1864 General Curtis, commander of the Military Department of Kansas, fearing that the Confederates were planning to make a raid upon Forts Larned and Lyon, ordered that federal troops be transferred from the Platte River to the Arkansas. Preparations accordingly were made, but the Confederate raid proved to be a mere rumor. Some evidence, nevertheless, does exist to show that the Indians were aware of Confederate plans. Simeon Whitely, United States Indian agent at Denver, mentioned having heard threats by Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes to take all the forts on the Arkansas River when joined by the Texas soldiers.

Despite these disquieting rumors, War Department reports for the Plains indicate that up to March, 1864, no information had reached headquarters that the Indians were considered unfriendly. General Curtis was busily engaged fighting bushwhackers and evidently had no idea that an Indian war was at hand. Like the Sioux War in Minnesota during 1862, the Cheyenne War of 1864 was precipitated by injudicious action upon the part of young military officers. A certain Lieutenant Fayre, in attempting to recover some

cattle supposedly stolen by Cheyennes, punished the wrong Indians. To make matters worse, Lieutenant Dunn of the First Colorado Cavalry on April 12th attacked a small band of Dog Soldier Cheyennes on the South Platte. The Indians were young warriors who were on their way north to visit their Northern Cheyenne relatives. A little later, Lieutenant Eayre drove Crow Chief and his Cheyenne band from their camp on the Republican River. In another expedition, Eayre met a group of Cheyennes near Fort Larned and again attacked them. This time he received the worst of the encounter and was forced to retreat to the Fort. The wrath of the warlike Cheyennes was aroused to a high degree by these attacks. A general Indian outbreak in Eastern Colorado and Western Kansas and Nebraska was the result.

Logically the Indians selected the great western highways as their main objectives. Immediately following Lieutenant Eayre's fight with the Indians near Larned, the redskins raided the stage road between Forts Larned and Riley. Arapahoes, antagonized by Captain Parmenter of Fort Larned, joined their Cheyenne friends on the warpath. The combined tribes then set about systematically to attack the Platte Trail and Santa Fe Trail, although they concentrated their efforts on the former. The trail to Santa Fe was generally left to the tender mercy of the Kiowas and Comanches, who resided south of the Arkansas River, and who also took to the warpath.

Realizing that a general outbreak was at hand, General Mitchell, commanding the Nebraska District of the Military Department of Kansas, asked General Curtis on May 27 for one thousand men and an artillery battery to protect the Platte Trail. Governor Evans of Colorado Territory also requested that Curtis protect the South Platte and Arkansas routes. The Colorado executive, apparently not getting satisfaction from the Department commander, on June 16 turned to General Carleton at Santa Fe for aid. He desired that Carleton send troops to Fort Union, New Mexico, subject to call from Colorado.¹¹ An unique attempt at handling the hostile Indians was made by Governor Evans in June. A proclamation was issued and sent to the Indian tribes in Eastern Colorado warning all friendly bands to report at certain concentration points. Cheyennes and Arapahoes were assigned to Fort Lyon, while the Kiowas and Comanches were ordered to Fort Larned. This proclamation was not obeyed¹² by the Indians to any great extent.

Since the aborigines preferred taking chances with their lives in preference to coming in and being "Good Indians", the war on the Plains continued throughout the summer. In July the hostiles commenced depredations in the neighborhood of Fort Larned. A government train bound for Fort Union, New Mexico, was attacked, twelve men being killed and a large quantity of merchandise destroyed.¹³ Shortly afterwards, four large trains were besieged near

Cow Creek, where a tremendous battle ensued. The beleaguered crews were finally rescued by some of Curtis' forces from Fort Riley.¹⁴

General Curtis had taken the field during July in a campaign which aimed to protect the trails and settlements and at the same time intimidate the Indians. Kansas militia, stationed at Emporia, were ordered to report to Curtis and hold themselves in readiness for assistance at any time.¹⁵ Curtis reported that his force numbered 395 men and consisted of militia, volunteers and regulars aided by a section of Ninth Wisconsin Artillery. In his letters the General referred to the siege on Cow Creek and an attack by Indians on Fort Larned.¹⁶ Curtis was highly commended by the press for his energetic campaign against the Indians.¹⁷ Before he had time to really accomplish much in an Indian war, however, the General was forced to abandon the project and return to Fort Leavenworth. The eastern border demanded immediate protection against the threatened raid of Sterling Price into Western Missouri. Curtis' chief accomplishment during his summer on the Plains was the founding of two military posts, Forts Ellsworth and Zarah.

While Curtis was still on the Plains, numerous Indian attacks occurred in Northern Kansas and Southern Nebraska. Newspaper reports from Marysville, Kansas, stated that sixteen whites had been killed and scalped and that nearly the entire population of Washington County was encamped in the

town for protection. In Marshall County the militia assisted by a company of Seventh Iowa Cavalry staged a four hour battle with a superior Indian force, but were forced to retreat.

In Nebraska and Eastern Colorado the Overland Mail was compelled to abandon four hundred miles of its route, while all stations but one along a line of one hundred and twenty miles had been burned. Immigration into Colorado and California over the Platte Trail was decisively checked.

The Indian hostiles were reported to have definitely proclaimed that the land belonged exclusively to them and that they intended to regain and hold it if they were forced to destroy every white man, woman and child to accomplish their purpose.

To meet this situation Governor Evans in August issued a proclamation to Colorado citizens advising them to hunt down Indians and kill all hostiles. This resulted in all the Indians of the region going to war. Evans later testified before a joint congressional committee that he had issued this proclamation at a time when Colorado had no troops to defend it.

In an effort to make peace, Major Wyncoop, commander at Fort Lyon, rounded up the leading Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs and took them to Denver to interview the Governor. Evans refused to come to terms with the chiefs, informing them that he was not the peace-making power and that they must make peace with the military authorities. For taking this stand Governor Evans was rebuked by Commissioner Dole of the Indian Bureau. Mr. Dole reminded Evans that his duty

as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Colorado required him to receive and encourage all advances made by the Indians in an effort to secure peace.²⁵

Peace efforts having failed, the Indian war continued until cold weather drove the hostiles into winter quarters. Before the descent of winter, however, there were several Indian scares in Kansas. Manhattan residents on October 19th informed Adjutant General Holliday that the entire military escort of the Santa Fe Express had been massacred west of Salina. Holliday was petitioned to send the Pottawattomie County Militia back to the western frontier at once.²⁶ Consequently, the Adjutant General directed Colonel Price of the Fifteenth Kansas Militia, then located at Fort Riley, to give special attention to the frontier in the neighborhood of Salina. Governor Carney was also requested by Holliday to grant the petition concerning the militia. Colonel Price, however, discovered that the story of the massacre of the stage escort was a fake. The escort arrived safely at Fort Zarah, although the frightened stage driver, having mistaken buffalo for Indians, returned to Salina. Price promised to keep the state authorities informed concerning future Indian disturbances. He clearly indicated, on the other hand, that he would use his discretion in defending the frontier settlements.²⁷

As a climax to the year's fighting came the Chivington Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians at Sand Creek on November

29th. The Sand Creek camp was located near Fort Lyon on the reservation which had been set aside for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe tribes by the Treaty of Fort Wise (later Fort Lyon) in 1861. As a matter of fact the Cheyennes had seldom remained on the reservation, which lay south of the Arkansas River in Colorado, but had roamed at will from the Red River to the North Platte. In the late summer of 1864, however, Black Kettle and White Antelope, in compliance with Governor Evans' proclamation, brought their respective tribes of Cheyennes in and camped near Fort Lyon. It is a point of interest to note that the camp was composed almost entirely of women, children, and old men. The warriors in most cases remained on the warpath. While Black Kettle, White Antelope, and other chiefs were in Denver engaging in a peace powwow with Governor Evans three war parties of Cheyennes and two of Arapahoes were still out.

On November 29th the Cheyenne and Arapahoe camp on Sand Creek was attacked by Colonel Chivington with a large force composed of regulars and Colorado volunteers. Of the five hundred Indians in camp about one hundred fifty were killed, two-thirds being women and children. The slaughter was frightful since the Indians were surprised and poorly armed. Atrocities committed by the troops were fully as bad as those usually practised by Indians upon their victims. Following the attack, the remnants of the tribes fled to the Big Timbers of the Smoky Hill in Western Kansas.

A great furore was raised in the East when the news of the massacre was fully published. General Halleck, Chief of Staff, at once ordered an investigation of Chivington's conduct, while General Curtis attempted to have him court-martialled. Chivington's term of service had expired, though, and he was beyond the reach of military law. Congress in 1865 attempted to punish Chivington and all members of the Third Colorado Regiment who engaged in the massacre. A resolution, S. R. 93, was introduced into the Senate to suspend the pay of all officers and men who so participated until an investigation could take place. The measure passed the Senate in January but was killed in the House.³² In the following session of Congress, however, the annual Indian appropriation bill was so amended that the members of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands who suffered at Sand Creek were to be recompensed in United States securities, animals, goods, provisions or such articles as the Secretary of the Interior might direct. The total amount of these gifts was \$39,050.³³ This Congressional act was in harmony with Article Six of the Treaty of the Little Arkansas, which had been drawn up October 14, 1865. The entire Article was a condemnation by the United States Government of Chivington's action.³⁴ The Indians thus emerged triumphant from the affair, while their conqueror, Chivington, fell into deep disgrace in the eyes of the Nation. To the Easterner, at least, Chivington merited about as much esteem as Benedict Arnold or Aaron Burr.

Although this is not an attempt to excuse Chivington

and his men for their brutal, inhuman atrocities at Sand Creek, it is worth while to point out some of the reasons why the massacre occurred. Judged from purely a military point of view, in which considerations of humanity have no place, it was good judgment to carry the war to the home of the Indian. Experience had proved that by only such methods could Indian uprisings be crushed. Chivington, therefore, used the same procedure which later won such nation-wide fame for Sheridan and Custer. Furthermore, there had been a demand for a winter campaign against the Indians. On November 19th, General Blunt, commanding the Upper Arkansas District, wrote to General Curtis urging a winter campaign. Governor Evans of Colorado had previously suggested the scheme as the only means of conquering the hostiles and bringing them to respect governmental authority. Public opinion in the frontier regions also was favorable to the winter campaign. The Junction City Union, a Kansas paper, openly advocated it.

"A successful war can only be waged against them (the Indians) by organizing an expedition that will penetrate their country and find the rendezvous of their women and children. Then they will stand and fight armed men and not before."

A third reason for the massacre is that the "hundred day volunteers", who made up the Third Colorado Cavalry, were chiefly frontiersmen who had suffered at the hands of

the Cheyennes and Arapahoes throughout the previous summer. To these men rules of warfare meant nothing. They retaliated with atrocity for atrocity.³⁸

In the long run the real sufferer from the Chivington Massacre was the frontier settler. Public sentiment in the East largely turned against him. The Indian, on the other hand, became a hero and martyr in the minds of many people living east of the Mississippi. This sentiment spread into Congress and seriously handicapped legislation aimed at frontier defense. Senator Ross of Kansas, on July 18, 1867, attempted to amend a bill by providing that the General of the Army should be authorized to accept the services of mounted volunteers from the governors of western states for suppression of Indian hostilities. He was outvoted, however, and compelled to accept a modification which defeated the purpose of the amendment.³⁹ Morrill of Maine, speaking in opposition to Ross, stated that volunteers from the frontier states caused all the difficulties with the Indians. As an example he cited the work of the Colorado volunteers in the Chivington Massacre.⁴⁰

Indian raids did not die out altogether during the winter of 1864-5. Hardly had the new year become well established before a raid occurred on the Santa Fe Trail west of Fort Larned. Cheyennes and Arapahoes numbering close to one hundred fifty attacked a wagon train at Nine Mile Ridge, wounding six white men. The Indian loss was unknown.⁴¹

Shortly after this episode the hostile bands of the two tribes moved north into Nebraska, headed for the Powder River Country. General Mitchell, commanding the District of Nebraska, (This was before its reorganization in 1865 as the Department of the Platte.), in order to drive the Indians out of the Republican Valley region, burned the prairie grass for over a hundred miles. The burned area extended⁴² throughout a favorite Indian hunting region. This action of Mitchell's contributed to the exodus of the hostiles from Kansas and Southern Nebraska. It simply meant, on the other hand, that their forces were to be concentrated with the hostile Sioux along the Platte Trail and Overland Telegraph line. As a consequence, the great Indian wars of 1865 took place outside of Kansas.

During the absence of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the Kansas frontier enjoyed a brief respite. Of course the Kiowas and Comanches were engaged in a series of depredations, but, comparatively, things were quiet during the spring and summer. On April 25th, Indians attacked Cow Creek Station on the Santa Fe Stage Company line, driving⁴³ off sixteen head of cattle. On June 9th, Kiowas charged upon a wagon train on Crooked Creek, in the southwestern section of the State. The train, which consisted of about seventy wagons under a military escort, successfully defended itself. In August, the Government was compelled to send a heavy escort to Fort Zarah in order to prevent the Indians from confiscating the eight thousand rations which were

being delivered to the Fort. These rations were consigned to the Indians, but the Great Father at Washington preferred handing them out to his red children instead of having them taken by force.

Having learned by experience the terrible cost of the Indian war of the previous year, the United States military authorities took decisive steps in 1865 to bring the war to a close. A three-fold plan was developed: first, to defend the settlements and routes of travel from Indian aggression; second, to invade the Powder River region in the Dakotas and strike a blow which would teach the Indian to respect the power of the Government; third, to make peace with the Indians in Kansas and arrange for their removal from the State. In pursuance of the first objective the Kansas government and people ably cooperated. Kansas troops also made up a large part of General Dodge's Powder River Expedition. As to the wisdom of the third part of the plan, making peace with the Indians, Kansans were frankly dubious.

The Kansas Legislature on January 17, 1865, adopted a concurrent resolution requesting Congress to secure from the President: (1) Full and ample protection against hostile Indians on the western border, (2) Prosecution of an active campaign against the Indians by an adequate force of federal troops, (3) Permission for the Governor of Kansas to organize a regiment of veteran volunteer cavalry to serve for one
45
year in the Indian campaign. These requests reveal the trend

of popular feeling within the State at the time.

Another event of significance in January was the re-organization of the national military departments. The old Department of Kansas was replaced by the Department of the Missouri, with General Grenville M. Dodge succeeding General Curtis.⁴⁶ The state legislature, upon receipt of this information,⁴⁷ extended Curtis a vote of thanks for his services.

In an effort to insure a greater degree of safety to travel on the Santa Fe Trail, Colonel Ford, commanding the District of the Upper Arkansas, provided for escort service⁴⁸ between Council Grove and Fort Larned. Twice a month, on the first and the fifteenth, a company of troops left Council Grove as an escort for travelers and freighters. From Larned west to Fort Union, New Mexico, the escort was composed of troops sent from the District of New Mexico.⁴⁹ A similar arrangement was made for east-bound transportation. Fort Dodge was also constructed during the year as an added⁵⁰ protection to Santa Fe travel.

An additional burden of protection was put upon the shoulders of the military authorities in Kansas when the Butterfield Overland Dispatch line was organized in 1865. The route extended for 585 miles from Leavenworth and Atchison to Denver via the Smoky Hill River.⁵¹ From its very beginning the B. O. D. needed military protection. In order to give the route adequate defense, a chain of forts and

outposts was constructed along the Smoky Hill Valley by the Government. The Butterfield line, despite this assistance, failed to make profits and didn't last long. Hostile Indians and too much competition with the Holladay line on the Platte Trail proved its undoing.

The frontier settlements in Western Kansas were successfully defended during the year by Colonel Cloud and the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry. A contemplated offensive against the Indians by Colonel Ford was never carried out due to the interference of Colonel Leavenworth, agent to the Kiowas and Comanches, who fancied that he could end the war by negotiation. Colonel Ford was delayed by Interior Department officials until the spring was so far advanced that the hostiles were too strong to be attacked by his forces.

While these events were transpiring, Governor Crawford was not idle. With his customary energy he plunged into the problem of frontier defense early in the year. In answer to numerous petitions from settlers in the south-central portion of the State, Governor Crawford endeavored to persuade both Curtis and Dodge to send a small force of cavalry to the region. Troubles had arisen between settlers and Indians in the Territory on account of cattle stealing. Many settlers were leaving because of the danger of possible Indian raids.

In August the Governor wrote to General Sheridan asking for the immediate muster out of the Eighth and Tenth Kansas

Volunteer Infantry. The reason given for the request was that the Indian situation on the western border looked threatening.⁵⁸ A few days later a similar request for the muster out of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was transmitted to General Grant.⁵⁹

While the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry remained in the State, the Eleventh and the Sixteenth were sent north with General Dodge to restore communication along the Platte Trail, to protect frontier settlements, and to drive the Indians into the Black Hills.⁶⁰ Although in February it had been the purpose of the Department of the Missouri to send the entire Eleventh Cavalry into the Smoky Hill region for an Indian campaign, a change of orders sent them to Fort Kearney, Nebraska, While part of the regiment guarded the Platte Trail and Overland Telegraph, the balance was sent to Fort Laramie for the spring campaign against the Sioux on Powder River.⁶¹ The work of protecting the transcontinental highway, although difficult, was admirably performed. Indians fairly swarmed along the telegraph line, but the soldiers were never driven from the field and the wires were kept in working order.⁶² On June 11th Colonel Preston B. Plumb was ordered to reopen and protect the Overland Stage Line and give all possible protection to emigrants and other travel. For the next two months Plumb and his men guarded the stage line, drove the stages by using cavalry horses, and kept the United States mail on schedule.⁶³ In August the Eleventh was ordered to Fort Leavenworth and mustered out of

service.

Less glorious was the performance of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry in the Black Hills. The Sixteenth had the misfortune to participate in a disastrous campaign. General Connor's forces were outnumbered and outgeneraled by the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors. The attempt to strike the Indian in his stronghold resulted in so much grief that the project had to be abandoned. The losses of the Sixteenth, nevertheless, were very small. One soldier was killed, one⁶⁴ wounded.

In October, General Grant announced his Indian policy. Generals Sherman and Pope were instructed to give particular attention to the problem of putting an end to Indian troubles along the great overland highways. Additional permanent forts were to be established along the Platte, Smoky Hill and Arkansas routes. Finally, the volunteers were to be replaced by four thousand colored troops.⁶⁵ This last move for several reasons was quite judicious. The negroes not only had proved to be good soldiers, but they were supposedly more free from prejudices against the Indians.⁶⁶ In addition to these advantages the negroes were willing to serve, whereas the white volunteers became quite ineffective⁶⁷ on account of their anxiety to be mustered out.

Another important event of October, 1865, was the negotiation of a treaty with the southern Plains tribes. The Chivington Massacre had the effect of practically annulling

the treaty of Fort Wise, since the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were afraid to remain in the region set aside for them in Colorado by the treaty. Hence it was desirable to make a new treaty which would include not only peace terms but provisions for settling the Indians on a permanent reservation. Indian commissioners selected by Congress came to Kansas in October and negotiated treaties with the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and Kiowa tribes. Two treaties were made: one with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the other with the Comanches and Kiowas. On October 14th, on the Little Arkansas River near the site of the present city of Wichita, the final agreements were drawn up. The United States was represented by seven commissioners: General Sanborn; General W. S. Harney; Thomas Murphy, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Central Superintendency; Kit Carson, the famous frontiersman; William W. Bent, the fur trader; Jesse H. Leavenworth, agent of the Comanches and Kiowas; and James Steele. The Indian delegation was composed of the most influential members of their respective tribes.

The most important terms of the treaty were contained in Articles 2, 3, and 4. The first of these provided for setting aside a permanent reservation for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, south of the Arkansas River. The Kiowas and Comanches were assigned to a region in Northwestern Texas and Indian Territory. The Indians were not to settle upon the reservations until the United States had extinguished the titles of the Cherokees and other claimants. When

absent from these reservations the Indians were not to go within ten miles of any of the main traveled routes. All claims of the Indians to the region between the Platte and the Arkansas were given up. Article 3 permitted the Indians to range in the unsettled portions between the two rivers.
69
Article 9 abrogated all existing treaties.

The United States Senate, on May 22, 1866, ratified the treaty with four amendments. The most significant of these was the amendment to Article 2. The Senate provided that no Indian reservation mentioned in the treaty should be located within the State of Kansas. Article 6 was also amended by removing the personal reference to Colonel Chivington.
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The Senate amendments were accepted by the Indians in November, 1866, and the treaty was formally proclaimed by President Johnson on February 2, 1867.
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As a preventative for future Indian wars the treaty was very defective. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were left without any definite reservation, since the Senate amendment to Article 2 excluded them from Kansas, while Article 9 took away their Colorado reserve. With these tribes turned loose and allowed to roam at will between the Platte and the Arkansas, the danger of conflicts with the whites remained as grave a problem as ever. Furthermore, that part of Article 2 which provided for the Indian remaining away from the main traveled routes could not possibly be enforced except by the Indians themselves.

Much evidence exists to cast doubt upon the permanency of the Indians' peaceful intentions. On their way to the council grounds a party of braves celebrated by attacking a Mexican train near Fort Dodge and killing five men.⁷² Also, the treaty, like most agreements with the Indians, was made in the fall when the warriors were tired of fighting and were looking forward to a winter of rest and recuperation in order to get ready for another big year. In November, consequently, Colonel Leavenworth was able to report truthfully that "his Indians" had for the most part, if not entirely,⁷³ stopped depredations along the Santa Fe Trail.

CHAPTER IV

INDIAN WARS OF 1866-1867 IN KANSAS

Part One, 1866

Comparatively speaking, the year 1866 passed rather quietly on the Kansas frontier. It was a period of lull after the wars of 1864-5 and preceding the great outbreak of 1867. Indian depredations were not only less numerous but of a more petty nature than those of the previous years. Early in the year the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes sent messengers to their northern brethern in order to persuade those hostiles to make peace. Major Wyncoop, former commander at Fort Lyon, was appointed by the War Department to¹ escort the envoys.

Indian outbreaks began in May along the Solomon River² and near Lake Sibley. Governor Crawford at once organized a battalion of militia and sent them to the region. The state troopers soon came into contact with the Indians, engaging a band of Cheyennes in a sharp fight in the Lake Sibley neighborhood.³ In July and August several raids occurred on White Rock and Lulu Creeks, tributaries of the Solomon River. Cheyennes were not guilty of the Lulu Creek attacks, these⁴ being the work of Pawnees and Omahas. In October and November, hunters were driven in by Indians on the Solomon.

Petty robberies and thefts were also committed in Clay, Republican and Shirley Counties.

Governor Crawford discovered in August that not only the Pawnees but Osages as well were responsible for the recent frontier outrages. He therefore ordered Colonel Cloud to visit their reservations and investigate. General W. S. Hancock, commanding the Department of the Missouri, was requested to furnish an excort from Fort Riley for
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 Colonel Cloud.

Overland transportation suffered more than did the
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 frontier settlements during 1866. The Smoky Hill Route continued to receive its full share of attention by the Indians. This no doubt was due to the fact that the Union Pacific Railroad Eastern Division was moving rapidly westward along the Kaw and Smoky Hill Valleys and gave promise of soon threatening the favorite buffalo hunting grounds of
⁷
 the red men. The Butterfield Overland Dispatch, which monopolized traffic over the route, was purchased by the Holladay interests in 1866 and merged with the Platte line into
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 the Holladay Overland Mail and Express Company. On April twentieth the new company started a daily schedule from both Topeka and Denver. As fast as the railroad was completed
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 westward the stages were moved to "End of Track".

As a protection to freighters, the War Department in February issued an order which required wagon trains to have at least twenty wagons and thirty men before they would be

allowed to pass Fort Kearney on the Platte Trail, Fort Riley on the Smoky Hill Route or Fort Larned on the Santa Fe Trail.¹⁰ Stages on all routes were guarded generally by military escorts while passing through the Indian Country. At each station a non-commissioned officer with a squad of soldiers¹¹ met the stage and escorted it to the next station.

Throughout the year Governor Crawford exerted tremendous efforts to put down Indian disturbances. The expense of defending the frontier with state militia was so great that the Governor hesitated to use them. As a consequence he appealed to the War Department and district commanders¹² to protect the settlements, but received no response. He telegraphed to the Secretary of War for cavalry arms, with which to arm the settlers, but failed to get them. The War Department informed Crawford that a shortage of troops prevented them from properly guarding the border. Crawford replied by offering to raise a Kansas regiment to be mustered into the United States service for the purpose of protecting the frontier until it could be replaced by army regulars.¹³ This offer was also rejected. These efforts having failed, the Kansas Executive telegraphed to the department commander at Fort Leavenworth stating that immediate action was needed and that, if the department commander would not act, he (the Governor) would send Major General Cloud with militia to pursue the Indians to their reservations, punish them, and compel indemnity for their past conduct.¹⁴ This elicited a response from General Hancock, who, on August twenty-eighth,

assured the Governor that he would cooperate with the state authorities in every possible way. Hancock had sent a scouting party of one hundred cavalry from Fort Harker to the Solomon and suggested that they operate with the state militia who were already scouting in that region.¹⁵

In the meantime, General Cloud was touring the settlements upon the Republican and Solomon Rivers. Here he proceeded to organize the residents into militia companies. He reported that the majority of the settlers were Civil War veterans and possessed guns but needed ammunition.¹⁶ As a result of his personal observations Cloud recommended to Governor Crawford that the militia be reorganized and that a United States military post be established in the exposed region.¹⁷

In the latter part of August, Colonel Wyncoop, in his official role as a peacemaker, assembled a group of Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs at Fort Harker for a council. The Indians thought that the Government had forgotten them since their promised annuities hadn't been received. Their attitude toward the construction of the railroad up the Smoky Hill was one of resignation to the inevitable. They realized (so they said) that the white man was too numerous to be overcome. Furthermore, they promised to restrain their young men from additional depredations.¹⁸

At no time in 1866 did the activities of the Indians assume the proportions of a general outbreak such as that of

1864-5. As a consequence, the strenuous attempts of Governor Crawford to compel the War Department to intervene in behalf of Kansas seem unnecessary. That both the War Department officials and General Hancock held this belief is signified by their policy of ignoring Crawford's feverish cries for assistance until they became so frequent that they had to be heeded.

Although Crawford's action in this instance was not altogether commendable, he accomplished another piece of work which perhaps was more praiseworthy. Having learned from the commander of Fort Harker that most of the outrages and murders committed by the Indians could be traced directly to alcoholic liquors, Governor Crawford recommended that the State Legislature prohibit all liquor traffic in Kansas beyond the limits of the organized counties. In compliance with this suggestion, the Legislature passed House Bill No. 105, which became a law on February 23, 1867.

Additional evidence that the Governor and people of Kansas may have been excessively excited over Indian troubles during the year was furnished by General William T. Sherman, who had been touring Kansas and Colorado in the fall of 1866. Sherman encountered no Indian troubles other than rumors. In referring to the latter he said, "These are all mysterious, and only accountable on the supposition that our people out West are resolved on trouble for the sake of the profit resulting from the military occupation."

CHAPTER IV

Part Two, 1867

In his own personal narrative Governor Crawford states:
"When I returned from Washington in April, 1867, General Hancock was in the field with a handful of United States troops, and the plains of Kansas were swarming with blood-thirsty Indians." Hancock had left Fort Leavenworth early in March upon a campaign designed to bring the Indians into submission. By showing a large force including artillery it was hoped that the red men would be frightened into a permanent peace. Hancock, with six companies of infantry and artillery, marched to Fort Riley where he was joined by Colonel George A. Custer, with four companies of Seventh Cavalry and one infantry company. At Fort Harker the expedition added two more cavalry troops. With this small army Hancock marched to Fort Larned, arriving on the seventh of April.²²

Cheyennes and Sioux were camped on Pawnee Fork about thirty miles northwest of the fort. When the Indians persistently refused to come in and make a treaty, Hancock decided to march on their encampment. On April 14th the regiment moved forward. Before reaching the camp they were met by a large body of Indians bearing a white flag. The chiefs said they wanted peace instead of war; nevertheless,

Hancock's troops moved forward and camped near their village. The Indians, fearing another Sand Creek massacre, fled during the night. Custer pursued them the next day, but the Indians, after raiding the Overland Stage Company stations on the Smoky Hill, scattered. Hancock burned the Indian village on Pawnee Fork and then marched to Fort Dodge. After remaining at Dodge several days his troops headed for Fort Hays. From thence he returned to Fort Harker, and on May 7th left that place for Leavenworth. Custer, with his Seventh Cavalry, remained in the field in pursuit of Pawnee Killer and his band of hostile Sioux. "Hancock's War" thus came to a sudden end following a very auspicious beginning.²⁴

Custer's pursuit of Pawnee Killer extended northward into Nebraska. The hostiles refused all overtures of peace and several times turned on Custer and became the pursuer instead of the pursued. After campaigning throughout the greater part of the summer the expedition returned to Fort Wallace in July, having failed to get more than an even break with their enemies. Lieutenant Kidder and a party of ten men, sent from Fort Sedgwick with dispatches for Custer,²⁵ were annihilated by Indians.

Hancock's campaign was unfortunate in its results, since it accomplished little except to incite the Indians to commit further depredations. Indian outbreaks in Kansas had been negligible prior to the expedition up Pawnee Fork. It is possible, therefore, that the war in 1867 was thus

precipitated by General Hancock himself. With both the Pacific railroads stretching out through the Indian Country, the situation was extremely delicate when the year opened. Through ignorance of Indian character the department commander committed the fatal blunder which started off one of the most serious seasons of Indian troubles which the Plains²⁶ ever witnessed.

Indian depredations in Kansas throughout the year were centered on the Smoky Hill Route and the settlements in the Solomon and Republican Valleys. By the middle of July the Union Pacific Eastern Division had reached Fort Harker and the town of Ellsworth. On September 18th the track extended to the 275 mile post at a point within ten miles of Fort²⁷ Hays. The Holladay Overland Mail and Express continued on²⁸ its daily schedule between End of Track and Denver.

As early as April 22nd Indians were reported swarming²⁹ along the Smoky Hill Route. It was estimated by stage passengers that they numbered two or three thousand. No doubt a great many of these were the Cheyennes and Sioux whom Hancock had routed a few days previously on Pawnee Fork. The greatest danger point along the route was the stretch between Ellsworth and Fort Wallace. During most of the summer the engineering and road building crews were advancing through this region. On May 23rd, R. M. Shoemaker, general superintendent of the Union Pacific Eastern Division, telegraphed Governor Crawford announcing an Indian attack on

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workers near Monument Station. In June, Shoemaker's telegrams persistently called upon Crawford for aid. Beginning with a raid west of Fort Harker on June 14th, the depredations increased in number and intensity. Shoemaker wired Crawford on the twenty-first asking for militia. This was followed three days later by an urgent message in which he informed the Governor that two workers had been killed and all workmen driven off the line for a distance of twenty miles. Five hundred stand of the best arms and plenty of ammunition were requested. The telegram closed with this statement: "Unless you send us protection our work must be

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abandoned." On June 24th, John D. Perry, President of the Union Pacific Eastern Division, appealed to Crawford for immediate aid, stating that in the absence of General Hancock he knew no other one to whom he could turn. Perry explained that Indian depredations extended along the whole line of road, that one thousand laborers on seventy-five miles of line had been driven in, and that his men were

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practically unarmed. Shoemaker frantically wired Crawford on the twenty-eighth announcing more depredations west of Harker and closing with the very decided declaration that unless the road were promptly protected all the workers would be driven off and all the citizens would be forced to

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leave the region.

Upon the receipt of Shoemaker's wire of June 21st, Governor Crawford leaped into action. His first efforts were directed toward getting arms and ammunition for the

railroad workers. On the twenty-second he appealed to the War Department for two thousand stand of cavalry arms and ammunition. Two days later he again wired Secretary Stanton asking him to direct immediately the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth to turn the arms and ammunition over to the State. Before sending this message to Stanton, the Kansas Executive had attempted to get ten thousand rounds of ammunition from Fort Leavenworth. Whether or not the arsenal had refused the request until otherwise instructed by Stanton is not clear. The fact remains that on the same day, by Special Order No. 136, General Hancock directed the commander of the Leavenworth arsenal to issue ten thousand rounds of 58 calibre cartridges for the State of Kansas. Crawford asked only for ammunition from Fort Leavenworth, stating that he had sufficient arms, yet on the same day he demanded both arms and ammunition of Stanton. This apparent inconsistency may have been due to the excitement of the moment. Many of the guns needed were in possession of the militia; consequently, Crawford instructed Captain J. G. Haskell at Lawrence to call in all the state and federal arms and ammunition in Lawrence and have one thousand stand packed for immediate shipment. On June 28th the Governor wired Captain J. C. French at Fort Leavenworth to ship what arms and ammunition he had as soon as possible. Shoemaker's men were thus provided with plenty of munitions within a few days after the sending of their appeal for protection.

Simultaneous with his campaign to provide arms for the

railroad workers, Governor Crawford endeavored to gain permission to organize a regiment of volunteer cavalry for service on the frontier. In his telegram to Stanton on June 24th, Crawford volunteered to raise such an organization. To give additional weight to his request the Governor enclosed President Perry's dispatch and added his own observation that the railroad west of Fort Harker and all Kansas frontier settlements would have to be abandoned unless⁴⁰ prompt and decisive measures were taken. Stanton replied on June 27th, referring him to General Grant, Commander in Chief⁴¹ of the Army. Grant, naturally, turned the matter over to Sherman, who was commanding the military Division of the Missouri.

Sherman wired Crawford on June 26th accepting a battalion of mounted volunteers provided that General A. J. Smith at Fort Harker deemed them to be necessary. Sherman stipulated that the battalion should consist of six or eight⁴² companies to be used for four months. General Smith signified his consent the next day in a telegram to Crawford; however, on the twenty-eighth he informed the Governor that⁴³ Sherman had countermanded the order. Shoemaker's message of the twenty-eighth also reported Sherman's change of mind. Crawford accordingly telegraphed Sherman and earnestly requested a reversal of his orders. In his plea the Governor said that it was impossible to move against the Indians with⁴⁴ militia. As a result of this action, General Sherman again reversed his decision and on July 1st gave Crawford permission

to raise the volunteer battalion. At once Governor Crawford issued a proclamation calling upon the people of Kansas for volunteers. Thus the Eighteenth Kansas Cavalry came into
⁴⁵
 existence.

Why did General Sherman first consent to the raising of the volunteer cavalry and then countermand the order shortly afterward? Apparently a conflict was going on in Sherman's mind between his personal views of the situation and his desire to cooperate with Crawford and the railroad officials. Sherman had little sympathy with the Indian, whom he consid-
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 ered the enemy of civilization. At the same time he favored
⁴⁷
 government protection for the transcontinental roads. Why then should he object to a proposition whereby the Union Pacific Eastern Division should get immediate protection? The answer is that he was heartily opposed to the raising of volunteer troops by any state for the defense of its local interests, since all other states and territories that had contact with the Indians would instantly start a clamor to
⁴⁸
 do likewise. It was his personal belief that each of the western states and territories wanted the entire United
⁴⁹
 States Army for its own protection. Sherman had stated his views quite plainly in a long telegram to Crawford on June twenty-fourth. The general tone of his message was a bit of advice to Crawford to act cautiously. The complete text of the telegram is given below:

"Your dispatch of today is this moment received.

I had already committed myself to be in St. Louis tomorrow from Omaha. I mailed you a circular defining as clearly as I can express how far you can help us to maintain peace on the border. This circular you ought to receive today. Until Congress gives to the military power the right to say what Indians are at peace and what at war, this conflict of races must go on. In the meantime I must leave to General Hancock to do his best. He is today at Denver, will start back on the Smoky Hill on the 27th and should reach Fort Harker and the telegraph in ten days. The Indians thus far seem to confine their attacks to isolated trains and to the roads and are in small bands strung from . . . Minnesota to . . . Texas. Yet almost every Indian Agent says his particular Indians are at home and at peace. If you choose to organize a battalion of volunteers, say six or eight companies, and offer them to Gen. Hancock on his arrival at Fort Harker, if he wants them I will approve, but my notion is he has troops enough. If we can only see where the Indians will turn up, which seems impossible. I prefer you deal with Gen.
50
Hancock as he is on the spot all the time."

Having yielded to the insistence of Crawford and the railroad people, however, Sherman came to Kansas immediately in order to be near the scene of action.

When General Sherman reached Fort Harker in July to investigate the Indian situation, railroad construction was advancing at a slow rate, while transportation from "End of Track" to Denver on the Smoky Hill Stage Line was virtually suspended. Only two stages had passed through to Denver during the previous month, and none had made the attempt in July up to the time of his arrival.⁵¹ Sherman at once looked into the matter. The result was a startling discovery which, if known sooner, likely would have forced him to withhold permanently his consent to the organization of the Eighteenth Kansas Cavalry. Sherman, upon investigation, was convinced that Indian depredations were not the real reason for the suspension either of railroad building or of travel on the Smoky Hill Stage Line. He contended instead that the railroad was delayed by excessive rainfall, while the stage line did not operate due to selfishness and cowardice on the part of the stage company officials.⁵² The General was also led to suspect strongly that Kansas newspapers and citizens were exaggerating Indian rumors. His natural conclusion, accordingly, was that neither Kansas nor the railroad and stage line needed the protection which they had gained as the result of Governor Crawford's persistent efforts.

Following his investigation of the Smoky Hill Stage situation Sherman transmitted a telegram to Crawford in which he condemned the stage company in no uncertain terms for its failure to operate.

"I believe," said Sherman, "there are other causes than Indians why the Smoky Hill Stage has not run. The railroad was delayed by high water and not by Indians and the stages have stopped for want of connection and because it is not profitable. I want both railroad and stage companies to prosper but cannot excuse them from doing their share of service unless they make efforts equal to the occasion. All our Posts and intermediate stations to Denver are safe. Trains of wagons go with light escort and even single carriers run from post to post. General Smith has offered the Stage Company any amount of guard but they wont go. Keep this to yourself only help me quiet down unnecessary alarm, which as you can see often does as much harm as real danger, and of course all parties having close contracts avail themselves of the alarm to avoid services and claim compensation and damage . . ."

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Two days later, Sherman informed Crawford that the Eighteenth Cavalry was being mustered-in at Fort Harker and that a company each of infantry and cavalry had been assigned to guard Shoemaker's construction trains. "The Conqueror of Atlanta" then closed with this statement:

"Though I assert that Indians have not delayed the progress of this road one hour. The stage company

deserves severe treatment for their efforts to avoid their contract and they may be the means⁵⁴ of breaking up the Smoky Hill line altogether."

The stage company referred to by General Sherman was Wells, Fargo and Company, who had bought out the Holladay interests in 1866 and had perfected a merger of several⁵⁵ mail, express and stage lines.

Sherman's indictment was not the only one hurled at the company. Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, while attempting to defend Wells, Fargo and Company before the Senate, unwittingly let fall information which supported Sherman's contention. Pomeroy and Thayer of Nebraska were denying the oft' repeated accusation of eastern papers that the contractors of the West wanted an Indian war. In the course of debate, Pomeroy stated that, due to Indian raids, Wells, Fargo was losing money daily in the performance of their United States Mail contract and that they would give a million⁵⁶ dollars to get out of it. This in itself is an indication that the company was not overly eager to continue operations on the Smoky Hill Route during June and July.

From still another source, Sherman's criticism is substantiated. Postmaster General Alex W. Randall, in his report for 1867, mentioned a similar denouncement of Wells, Fargo as follows:

"During the spring and summer months the com-

plaints as to the manner in which the service was being performed, and the great delay in the arrival of mail from the East at Denver . . . were more numerous than at any time since the present route has been in operation. It was charged that the Indian troubles, complained of by the contractor and given by his agents as an excuse for non-performance of service, were a pretence, and that this was no reason why the mails should not be conveyed regularly and within schedule time."

The Postmaster General concluded, on the other hand, that the contractor (Wells, Fargo and Co.) was not to blame for the delay in service. The Indian situation on the Plains, he decided, was really serious. As proof for this final conclusion, he cited official reports to the War Department by General Sherman and other army officers. It is evident that the Postmaster General knew nothing of Sherman's revelations to Crawford concerning the refusal of the stage company to resume service even under heavy escort.

Western transportation companies undoubtedly did take advantage of the United States Government during this period. By the nature of their contracts they could collect their money whether or not they maintained an unbroken schedule. Regardless of the motives of the stage company, whether it was to make money with a minimum amount of effort, as implied by Sherman, or to keep from losing money, as asserted

by Pomeroy, the fact remains that service was intentionally suspended for several weeks on the Smoky Hill line.

There is, of course, some evidence to justify the stage company for discontinuing its service. A special correspondent of the Leavenworth Conservative, located at Fort Wallace with a railroad engineering expedition, declared that the route was closed because the troops for its protection had been sent to guard the Platte line. The writer was highly indignant because the interests of the Smoky Hill line were sacrificed for those of the Platte. This correspondent, in two separate articles, maintained that the stage stations were being attacked daily and that during the month of June \$100,000 worth of property was destroyed besides many lives being lost. An account of an Indian raid at Pond Creek Station was also given. Even Fort Wallace was attacked on June twenty-first by about three hundred Indians, according to the writer. The article of July second stated that the fort was still besieged.⁵⁰ Practically the same assertions were made by General W. W. Wright, Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific Eastern Division, in a report to President John D. Perry on June 29th. Wright was commander of the engineering expedition at Fort Wallace.⁶⁰

The truth of the whole matter probably is that during the Indian raids of the latter part of June the stage company officials had reason for closing down; but that in the early part of July, when traffic should have been resumed,

they failed to perform their duty.

Another problem with which General Sherman had to contend was that of false reports and rumors of Indian uprisings. His personal attitude toward this question was well expressed in his telegram to Governor Crawford on July eighth in which he requested that Crawford help him to quiet down unnecessary alarm.⁶¹ In a letter to his brother, the General denounced the publication of rumors. "Not only real depredations are committed" (by the Indians), he asserted, "but every fear, or apprehension, on whatever it may be founded, is published, and protection claimed and demanded." Further on in the letter, Sherman emphasized that fact that the clamor of the people for protection really weakened the military power in the region since it necessitated breaking up his forces into small groups. This, he declared, prevented the collection of any large army to carry an offensive into the Indians' own country, the Yellowstone and Red River localities.⁶²

Sherman's contention that rumors were harmful was upheld by the Fort Harker correspondent to the Leavenworth Conservative. In an article to his paper on July 8, 1867, the writer complained about the false propaganda which was being circulated by a rival paper, the Leavenworth Commercial. The writer for the Conservative denied that there was any truth to the recent stories of Indian raids near Ellsworth. He added that between Harker and Hays all was quiet.

Beyond that point he had no information since, for some reason unknown to the people of his vicinity, the stage had not come through from the west for some time.⁶³

After General Sherman had returned to St. Louis, the Republican of that city printed an article from Fort Harker which reported the massacre near Fort Larned of a party of Catholic priests and nuns. Sherman at once published a reply denying the truth of the incident and rebuking newspaper journalists for publishing unfounded rumors.⁶⁴ It was later proved that the article was false. The story of the massacre had been published by a Leavenworth rival of the Conservative. The editor of the Conservative, although stating that he had not printed the report, denied that the newspapers of Kansas were publishing exaggerated stories. At the same time he warned his readers to beware of Indian news printed in any rival Leavenworth papers.⁶⁵

Additional proof that one of the Leavenworth papers was guilty of "yellow journalism" comes from an entirely different source. A prominent official of the Union Pacific Eastern Division, writing in September, 1867, reported that Ellsworth was a great place for the manufacture of news. He also mentioned that a reporter for a Leavenworth journal was filling his paper with startling accounts of Indian raids and horrible murders which were being copied by "all the eastern papers as the true state of affairs in the West."⁶⁶

While the Sherman investigation and newspaper controversy

were taking place, the Eighteenth Kansas Cavalry was organized, mustered into service and baptized with fire. When Governor Crawford issued his call for volunteers on July first, it was his intention to raise eight companies of cavalry for six months service. As a matter of fact only four companies were raised and the regiment was required to serve only four months. The reason for this change of plans will soon be apparent.

Recruiting officers soon found that they could get plenty of men but very few horses. Crawford on July third asked Sherman if the Government would furnish horses for part of the men. Sherman refused, stating that if eight mounted companies could not be furnished a less number would be sufficient.⁶⁷ Telegrams and letters literally poured into the executive offices in Topeka during the next few days. The majority of these were in regard to getting horses. Accordingly, Crawford on July tenth again telegraphed Sherman inquiring if he would take part of the men unmounted. Sherman again rejected the suggestion, remarking that if the men could not be mounted they were not wanted.⁶⁸ This attitude of Sherman was quite disconcerting to certain Kansans who were striving mightily to organize a full eight-company-regiment. On July fifth, Governor Crawford received the following telegram from A. Green of Manhattan:

"I can get horses if Adjutant General will issue certificate of indebtedness. Pottawatomie is best

place. I came up with General Sherman. He would
⁶⁹
not grieve if you fail. Come up tomorrow."

According to the terms of enlistment, each volunteer was supposed to furnish his own horse. He was then to be armed, equipped and paid by the United States as were other regular troops. In case a volunteer had no horse and was unable to purchase one the State guaranteed to stand secur-
⁷⁰
 ity for the payment. In order to pay all creditors for horses purchased without waiting for a delayed legislative appropriation, the recruits gave their personal notes at the time of purchase. The recruiting officer was then instructed to draw the cash pay of each soldier so indebted and transmit it to the creditor until the note was paid in
⁷¹
 full. The Governor assured all questioners that each soldier who furnished a horse would be reimbursed later by legislative appropriation.

With the horse problem once solved, the routine of organization went on steadily. By the fifteenth of July the Eighteenth Kansas was mustered into United States service at Fort Harker. The battalion was made up of four companies with a total enrollment of three hundred fifty-eight officers
⁷²
 and enlisted men. That there was a real need for the regiment was revealed by General Sherman in his annual report for the year. The report explained that the Eighteenth was called into service to replace six companies of Seventh Cavalry that had been transferred to the Platte early in the
⁷³
 summer.

Under the able leadership of Major Horace L. Moore of Lawrence, the Eighteenth Kansas performed creditably and was of real service to the State and Nation. In addition to fighting the Indians, the men faced a far deadlier enemy, cholera, which took a heavy toll of recruits at Fort Harker, on July 24th the regiment was at Fort Larned. Shortly afterward it was moved to Fort Dodge and finally to Fort Hays on August 15th. While stationed at Hays the Eighteenth performed its most active service. On August twenty-second, part of the regiment participated in the Battle of Beaver Creek. Following an Indian raid on the Smoky Hill Stage Line at Big Creek Station, Major Armes organized an expedition of Tenth United States and Eighteenth Kansas cavalry and pursued the hostiles north into the Republican Valley. While out on a scout for the expedition, Captain Jenness of the Eighteenth Kansas and a small body of troops were attacked by about five hundred Indians. They withstood the onslaught until rescued by Major Armes and the main body. The Indians then attacked the entire force. The battle raged for six hours before darkness caused the fighting to cease. Satanta, the Kiowa chief, was reported to have led the Indians. ⁷⁴ The soldiers' losses were three killed and ⁷⁵ thirty-five wounded. Meanwhile, Major Moore and the balance of the Eighteenth were campaigning in the same general region. Although neither Indians nor soldiers could claim decisive victories the campaign had the effect of breaking up the Indian concentration along the Smoky Hill and the

Republican. The northern Indians retreated to the north while the Comanches, Kicwas, Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes headed south, where they met the Peace Commission at Medicine Lodge in October.⁷⁶ The Eighteenth continued to serve until October 29th, when it was ordered to Fort Harker to be mustered out. On November 15th the final muster took place.⁷⁷ It was deemed unnecessary to keep the soldiers in service for six months, since there was no need for them during the winter. About ten per cent of the regiment lost their lives during their four months service.

Throughout the months of July and August, reports of Indian depredations had continued to come in. A perfect reign of terror took place in Colorado Territory during the early part of July. Settlers left the country, and there was talk of discontinuing overland travel.⁷⁸ One of Custer's scouts, in relating the story of the Kidder Massacre and an attack by Indians on Custer's supply train, closed the interview with these words:

"If any man thinks there is no war with, or danger from the Indians, let him make a trip from Wallace to Harker and then he will realize it."⁷⁹

Service was finally resumed on the Smoky Hill Route during the last days in July. On the twenty-seventh, the first west-bound mail coach reached Denver after a ten-day trip from Fort Harker. Indians were numerous between Harker and

Monument Station and, according to reports, were virtually⁸⁰ in possession of one hundred miles of the road. Santa Fe coaches, on the other hand, were coming through to Fort Harker unmolested though many Indians were seen along the⁸¹ route.

Osages dwelling in the southeast section of the State caught the fever of the Indian war on the Plains and performed some minor depredations. Governor Crawford paid them a visit in August and called them to account for thieving of horses and other stock from settlers. The Osages promptly⁸² returned the property and thereafter remained "Good Indians". The Governor discovered that Indian traders were daily supplying the Osages as well as the wild Plains tribes with⁸³ arms and ammunition.

The Indian Peace Commission, which had been appointed in July by act of Congress, held a meeting in St. Louis on August eighth. As a result General Sherman ordered all department commanders in the Division of the Missouri to assume defensive tactics only, thus giving the Indians a chance to receive the messages sent out from the Peace Com-⁸⁴mission and to act on them. In a telegram to General Hancock more explicit directions were given. Hancock was instructed to send out orders to all posts that, when the cavalry parties still out came in, they defend the Platte and Smoky Hill routes as well as possible and only pursue parties that had committed recent outrages. Sherman reiterated his decision to give the Indians a fair chance to

make peace with the Commission. He also condemned the act of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Omaha for granting permits to the Pawnee, Omaha and Spotted Tail Sioux tribes for buffalo hunting on the Republican. Hancock enclosed a copy of Sherman's instructions in a letter to Crawford explaining that they indicated the future course which the military were to pursue between the Smoky Hill and Republican. Referring to the Beaver Creek conflict, Hancock said, "Captain Armes was out and had not received the dispatch or he would have had no fight. Of course Major Moore, and Major Elliot acted correctly in going to the enemy under the circumstances."⁸⁵

In view of this change of tactics upon the part of the military authorities, matters became somewhat complicated when the Indians again attacked the Smoky Hill Route in September. Shoemaker wired Crawford on the twenty-first informing him that one of the principal contractors and three men were killed by Indians on the nineteenth. Since General Smith at Fort Harker could give no additional protection the general superintendent asked the Governor for an infantry regiment at once to guard the working parties.⁸⁶ Crawford replied immediately, "Your dispatch received. Will tender regiment to General Sherman. If he will not accept on behalf of Government, I will endeavor to make other arrangements."⁸⁷ Governor Crawford then made a speedy trip to Fort Hays to investigate matters and upon his return sent two telegrams to Sherman describing the situation and

offering to organize immediately a regiment of volunteers.

Sherman's reply threw cold water on the proposition.

The complete telegram follows:

Headquarters, Military Division
of the Missouri,
St. Louis, Sept. 24, 1867.

Gov. Crawford:

With the present convictions of the Indian Commission to be at Fort Harker the eighth I would not be willing to accept more volunteers. Mr. Shoemaker ought not to push his parties too far out till we meet the Cheyennes.

W. T. Sherman
Lieut. General. 90

Sherman thus remained consistent with his previous position. Crawford, plainly, was out of sympathy with the Peace Commission and considered defense of the railroad paramount. The crux of the matter was whether or not the road actually needed more protection than it was already getting. One wonders what the Eighteenth Kansas was doing at the time. Considerable light is shed on the question by Mr. Marshall, who was on the scene at Fort Harker as a representative of the railroad's eastern financial interests. Writing from Junction City on September eighteenth, Marshall explained that he had just gone up to the end of the track with the railroad commissioners, that a military escort had

accompanied the train and that they were not molested. Further on he states:

"The Indians west of us have been making some trouble lately, but I do not apprehend any trouble with our trains. There have been several attacks made on wagon trains and some stock stolen, and a few men killed, but those things you must expect when you pass over other peoples grounds."⁹¹

The Peace Commission, following its meeting in St. Louis, headed northwest up the Missouri River in order to treat with the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes before meeting the tribes in Kansas. Sherman invited Crawford to meet the Commission at Fort Leavenworth on August eleventh.⁹² Crawford accepted and presented his views to the commissioners. A Leavenworth daily, reporting the Governor's presence in town, had this to say: "The Governor will confer with the Peace Pow-wow-ists, but is not known to sympathize with their policy. He is for extorting peace. We guess."⁹³ In September, Crawford further vented his opinion of the Commission. "I am waiting patiently," he wrote, "the result of the efforts of this peace commission. If they fail to do their duty the State of Kansas will not fail."⁹⁴ Sherman also was not optimistic about the possibility of peace, although he expressed some hopes. Writing to his brother on September 28th, he predicted that the Indian wars were not over, since it would take years for the Peace Commission to fulfill the require-

ments of the law passed by Congress.

In October the Peace Commission arrived in Kansas. Its personnel had been carefully chosen by Congress from both military men and civilians. Generals Terry, Harney, Sanborn and Auger represented the army, while Commissioner Taylor upheld the interests of the Indian Bureau. Senator Henderson of Missouri represented Congress, and Colonel Samuel Tappan stood for the nation at large. For a month prior to the meeting the Indian Bureau had been assembling a vast amount of material near Medicine Lodge to give the Indians as presents. These stores included coffee, sugar, flour, dried fruits, arms and ammunition and a herd of cattle. ⁹⁶

Once the Indians were assembled, the pow-wow began. Estimates of the number of Indians present vary from five thousand to fifteen thousand. ⁹⁷ The tribes represented were the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache. Tall Bull, a prominent Cheyenne war chief, ably stated the Indian's case when he told the commissioners that the red men were on the warpath to prevent Kansas and Colorado being settled by pale-faces. He said that the Indians claimed that part of the country as their own, and did not want railroads built through it to scare away the buffalo. At one time during the early stages of the conference it seemed that negotiations would stop and a general massacre ensue. Since there were less than five hundred soldiers present, the commissioners exhibited some uneasiness. Nevertheless,

the Indians were kept in awe by a show of artillery, so the
pow-wow continued.⁹⁸

Two treaties were drawn up and signed. On October twenty-first, the commissioners reached their final agreement with the Comanche, Kiowas and Apaches. The Cheyennes held off until a week later, when they and their Arapahoe allies came to terms. The two treaties were nearly identical in make-up. According to the final arrangement the Indians agreed to:

- (1) Withdraw all opposition to the construction of the Pacific railroads.
- (2) Relinquish their claims to the land lying between the Platte and Arkansas.
- (3) Withdraw to reservations set apart for them.

In return the Indians received the following concessions:

- (1) A large reservation and an enormous amount of supplies. (The Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches were assigned to a reserve north of the Red River. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were allotted about three million acres in the Cherokee Outlet in Indian Territory.)
- (2) The right to hunt south of the Arkansas River so long as the buffalo ranged there in such numbers as to justify the chase. No white settlements were to be allowed between the

Arkansas River and the southern boundary of
 99
 Kansas for a period of three years.

Contrary to a general impression which has grown up in the United States, the Medicine Lodge Treaty did not bring peace to the frontier. After loading the Indians up with guns and ammunition the Peace Commission promised to provide more for them the next spring. This mistaken policy on the part of the commissioners practically undid everything that had been accomplished by the treaty. It remained for the military authorities to bring about peace by conquest in
 100
 1868. Even from the standpoint of the Indian, the treaty was a failure. "The giving of a few presents and the signing of treaties by a few chiefs would not appease the Indians, whose livelihood, the buffalo, was being destroyed
 101
 and driven away." The young men of all the tribes bitterly opposed the treaty; hence it could not be expected that the terms of the agreement would be observed.

After the break-up of the great Medicine Lodge encampment, the Indians headed south and west leaving the Kansas frontier in peace during the fall and winter. Sheridan, upon taking command of the Department of the Missouri, re-
 102
 ported everything comparatively quiet. At the very close of the year reports reached Topeka of Indian depredations on White Rock Creek in Republic County. These proved to be the
 103
 work of a party of Omahas and Otoes.

The year 1867 was outstanding in the annals of Plains

warfare. Commencing early in the spring, the war between Indians and whites dragged through a long summer and well into the autumn. While no general massacre of settlers took place, there were over four hundred citizens murdered by the southern tribes in Kansas and Nebraska during 1866 and 1867. Sixteen engagements occurred during the latter year between Indians and United States troops in the Missouri department. So numerous indeed were the conflicts on the Plains that one writer has credited the summer of 1867 with more actual cavalry fighting than any season in the ten years of Plains combat from 1864 to 1874.¹⁰⁴ While this statement may be correct, it is well to add that the conflicts between the military and Indians during the year were not especially bloody. In the entire Department of the Missouri during 1867 nineteen soldiers were killed and fifty wounded, while only ten Indians were sent to the Happy Hunting Ground.¹⁰⁵

CHAPTER V

THE INDIAN WARS OF 1868-1869

Part One, 1868

Indian affairs in Kansas remained unusually quiet in the spring of 1868. Nothing of note happened until the early part of June, when the Cheyennes raided Council Grove. Minor depredations occurred during July followed by an invasion of the Saline and Solomon valleys in August. On August twenty-third, General Sheridan ordered the Indians out of the State. While a volunteer battalion patrolled the frontier districts, Sheridan organized his regulars and carried on a fall and winter campaign into the Indian's stronghold in the Indian Territory and Texas. The result was the complete subdual of the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and Kiowa tribes. Sheridan's forces were ably assisted in this campaign by the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry.

Before any critical estimate can be made of Sheridan's campaign, it is necessary to return to the events which led up to that final crushing of the Plains tribes in Kansas. In the spring of 1868 the nomadic Indian tribes had gone into camp near Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, where they proceeded to draw rations from the Government until the buffalo migration reached the Kansas plains. The Kiowas, Comanches

and part of the Cheyennes located at Larned, while the Arapahoes, Apaches and the balance of the Cheyennes chose Fort Dodge.¹ During this period General Sheridan endeavored to establish a more friendly basis for Indian relations. In an effort to explain further the terms of the Medicine Lodge treaties, special agents had been sent among the tribes the previous autumn. William Comstock and Abner S. Grover were dispatched to the Cheyennes and Richard Parr to the Kiowas and Comanches. For a time it seemed that success would crown their efforts, but by the following spring it became apparent that the Cheyennes were not to be reconciled so easily.² Comstock and Grover were treacherously attacked, Comstock losing his life as a result. General Sheridan powwowed with the Indians at Fort Dodge but gained little satisfaction. The young men were extremely dissatisfied with the Medicine Lodge arrangements and were in an ugly mood. Warriors, chiefs, medicine men, all the tribal leaders, made³ one demand--arms and ammunition.

The problem involved was a thorny one which remained unsolved from the previous year. In January, 1867, General Sherman had ordered General Hancock to stop the practice of Indian agents selling arms to the Indians. All sales by law were to be under the rigid control of the commanding officers of posts within the Indian districts. The law was being flagrantly violated, however. Sherman threatened, consequently, to withdraw United States troops from the plains region altogether unless the unlimited and unlicensed

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sale of arms stopped. Sherman appealed to Grant, who in turn, addressed the Secretary of War, urging the abolition of civil Indian agents and licensed traders. Grant also seconded Sherman's threat to withdraw the troops from the frontier. Since the problem involved a conflict between the War Department and the Interior Department, which contained the Indian Bureau, Congress became the final authority. On February 1, 1867, Secretary Stanton transmitted to the House Committee on Indian Affairs a letter from Major Douglas, commander at Fort Dodge. Douglas had reported that a large trading business had grown up at the fort between traders and Indians, that Butterfield, the former head of the Overland Dispatch, had the largest investment of all the traders, and that several cases of arms had been sold by Butterfield to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. "Between the authorized issue of the agents and the sales of the traders," said Douglas, "the Indians were never better armed than at the present time." Continuing, the letter related that the Indians were openly boasting of their preparedness for war in the spring. Further incriminating statements were made by Major Douglas.

"The agents have no real control over the traders; in fact, they are accused by many, both Indians and white men, of being in league with them, and of drawing a large profit from the trade. The anxiety of the Indians at the present time to obtain arms and ammunition is a great temptation

to the trader. For a revolver an Indian will give ten, even twenty times its value in horses and furs." ⁶

It developed that Butterfield had consulted experienced Indian agents before selling arms to the Indians. William H. Bent, E. W. Wyncoop, and Colonel J. H. Leavenworth had addressed a circular letter to the new trader informing him that he was authorized to sell arms or ammunition to any Indians that were at peace with and receiving annuities from the United States. ⁷ Feeling that he had received official consent, Butterfield accordingly went ahead with his sales, since the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were receiving annuities and so were technically at peace.

While Congress was debating the question in committee, the practice of evading the law continued. Governor Crawford, while in Washington in April, 1867, visited the Interior Department and roundly denounced it for supplying the Indians with arms and ammunition to be used against frontier people. The Secretary promised that arms would not be issued to the tribes that were on the warpath. This promise was ⁸ then immediately broken. Indian supplies were sent to Atchison in July consigned to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who were on the warpath. Hearing of the presence of the supply train in Kansas, Governor Crawford telegraphed General Sherman and threatened to have it burned unless the War Department prevented the supplies from reaching the Indians.

Sherman therefore ordered the cavalry from Fort Riley to capture the train and store the supplies in Fort Larned. There they remained until October, when the Peace Commission⁹ distributed them to the Indians at Medicine Lodge. When these and other supplies provided by the commissioners were exhausted, six wagon loads more of revolvers were supplied¹⁰ from Fort Harker.

His indignation once aroused, Crawford was relentless in his persecution of Indian traders and agents. Having learned that one of Colonel Leavenworth's traders at Wichita was supplying the Kiowas and Comanches with arms and ammunition, the Governor made a public statement denouncing such practices. The trader, J. R. Mead, then wrote Crawford in an aggrieved tone, denying everything. Crawford sent a scorching reply on September fourth. Extracts from the letter follow:

"You, I am informed, are one of his (Leavenworth's) traders. If such be the fact, it is doubtless to your mutual interest to cooperate with each other in explaining and covering up as far as possible the damnable outrages committed by agent traders and Indians during the present year."

The Governor then proceeded to tell Mead that arms and ammunition had been passing into the Indian Country all summer by way of the mouth of the Little Arkansas. Crawford warned Mead not to ship any more arms to the Indians, and closed

with this:

"The Kiowa or Comanche Indian who has committed most fiendish outrages in Kansas is no worse than his agent who represents him as at peace, or the trader who furnishes him with supplies which enable him to execute his designs."¹¹

With the history of the previous year as a warning, General Sheridan refused to deliver more arms to the Indians in the spring of 1868.

The month of June, 1868, brought the biggest Indian scare that Kansas ever witnessed. On June third, citizens of Marion County and vicinity received warning that a large band of Indians was approaching. Settlers from miles around flocked into town for protection. The Indians appeared, some three hundred strong, but passed by the frightened town without molesting it. Farm houses were ransacked and stock¹² killed by the invaders. The objective of this Cheyenne raid was the Kaw Indian Reservation at Council Grove. On June fifth the Cheyennes arrived and attacked the Kaws. After a long drawn out battle in which few fatalities occurred, the Cheyennes were driven off and headed westward, committing petty outrages as they went.

Quite naturally the entire east-central portion of the State was aroused. Armed bodies of citizens instantly collected in Morris, Lyon, and Chase Counties, but the men were

entirely without organization and recognized no one as com-
¹³
 mander. Not knowing where the Indians would strike next,
 the suspense was terrible to the people in the region. Ef-
 forts to allay their fears were made by the newspapers. It
 was soon discovered that the Cheyenne raid was aimed only at
 the Kaws, and that the motive back of it was retaliation for
 the death of seven Cheyennes at the hands of the Kaws the
¹⁴
 previous summer.

The chief result of the raid was that the state govern-
 ment, in cooperation with the Department of the Missouri,
 evolved a more effective system of frontier protection. As
 an emergency measure, General Sheridan dispatched cavalry
¹⁵
 from Forts Harker and Riley to the Council Grove vicinity.
 On June eighth the General ordered that fifteen thousand
 rounds of ammunitions be shipped to Governor Crawford for
¹⁶
 distribution among the frontier settlers. Four days later,
 Mr. McAfee, Adjutant General of Kansas, left Topeka in order
 to distribute the ammunition and arms provided by Sheridan.
 McAfee also had instructions to organize a company of reserve
¹⁷
 cavalry.

For permanent protection of the western border Sheridan
 decided to organize a cavalry patrol by establishing tempor-
 ary camps in the exposed region. Prior to the raid, a cav-
 alry company had been stationed at the mouth of the Little
¹⁸
 Arkansas. On June twentieth Sheridan informed Crawford that
 another company had been posted at the Kaw Crossing of the

Santa Fe Trail on the Cottonwood River near Marion. The two companies in cooperation with the troops at Fort Harker thus patrolled the border from Harker south to Wichita.

These precautions were in line with the demands of the settlers of the region and accomplished a great deal toward relieving their anxiety. The War Department also aided by issuing an order directing the commanders of departments to use their own judgment in issuing ammunition to state and territorial authorities for frontier protection.²⁰ It suited the people of Kansas to have this power in the hands of General Sheridan rather than the War Department, since they had great confidence in the good judgment and cooperative spirit of "Little Phil".

Tall Bull's Council Grove raid proved costly to the Cheyennes because it prevented them from collecting their annuity arms and ammunition for a time. By the middle of July, however, the Indians appeared in large numbers at Fort Larned and threatened to storm the fort and take the arms by force.²¹ Had not General Sully maintained a bold front the hostiles might have carried their threats into action.²² Finally the tribes deserted the fort, but the general impression among military officers was that they intended to return after placing their women and children in positions of safety.²³ Shortly afterwards, the Indians came back. This time, by astute diplomacy, they were able to get the desired arms. They promised to use the arms for hunting purposes only,

claiming that they needed more ammunition in order to hunt on their way south in the autumn. General Sully was completely hoodwinked by their fair promises and accordingly issued the arms. By August third the last of the arms were distributed. Immediately the Indians left for parts unknown.²⁴

At the first hint of trouble, Colonel Thomas Murphy, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Central Superintendency had gone to Larned to investigate the situation. He found the Indians cross and sullen because of the non-delivery of arms and ammunition. When he left, conditions were quiet. Colonel Murphy, therefore, was able to announce to the press of August fifth that an Indian outbreak was unlikely to occur and that the Indians were convinced of their own inability to continue hostilities against the whites.²⁵

While the Colonel was publishing this statement, a band of approximately two hundred Cheyennes were on the warpath under the command of the Dog Soldier chief, Red Nose, and The-man-who-breaks-the-marrow-bones, a prominent member of Black Kettle's band. Nearly all the Cheyenne bands were represented in the war party.²⁶ Beginning on the Smoky Hill Valley and Kansas Pacific Railroad, the Indians swept northward to the Saline and thence to the Solomon and Republican Valleys. In the course of a few days time they had killed at least a dozen settlers, outraged several women, some of whom were carried into captivity, burned and ransacked houses, stolen stock, driven hundreds of settlers from the region and completely paralyzed Northern Kansas with fright.²⁷

First news of the raid reached Topeka on August fifteenth. Colonel McAfee and Governor Crawford immediately left for the exposed regions in order to make preparations for arming and organizing the settlers for defense. Fortunately for the Asher Creek settlement, Colonel McAfee had delivered them a shipment of arms before the raid. They were thus able to drive the Indians away. McAfee toured the settlements for several days, organizing, arming and providing for the destitute.²⁸ All attempts at pursuing the raiders failed. Governor Crawford hastily organized a volunteer company at Salina, but it was too late to accomplish much.²⁹ On the seventeenth, Crawford appealed to President Johnson for aid. In his message the Governor asked not only for aid but requested: (1) That the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches be driven from Kansas; (2) That the President keep the Indian Commission at home; (3) That the Government stop issuing arms and ammunition to the Indians. Crawford promised the cooperation of Kansas in any effort to drive the Indians from the State. His message was referred to General Sherman, who ordered immediate action.³⁰ Regular troops were rushed to the scene of the raids by command of General Sheridan. Troops stationed on the Little Arkansas and detachments from Forts Riley and Harker were at once transferred to the Saline and Solomon region.³¹ Sheridan then ordered General Sully to erect block houses on the Saline, Solomon, and Republican. These forts were garrisoned with infantry, while the region lying between the posts was

32

patrolled by cavalry. On August twenty-first, Sheridan informed Crawford that he was going to order all the Indians to their reservations. The order was issued two days later. 33

After a week of intense excitement, Kansans realized that the worst was over. Settlers accordingly returned to their claims and life went on as before. About the only beneficial result of the raid was that the settlers and the military became better prepared to withstand any future Indian depredations in the region. By October the inhabitants of North-central Kansas were so destitute as a result of Indian raids and crop failures that it became necessary to send them financial relief. Various organizations in the eastern part of the State put on campaigns and raised funds that these pioneers might remain on their claims through the 34 winter.

Governor Crawford's appeal to the President evidently produced results. The War Department was given a free hand to prosecute the Indian war to a finish. Even the Commissioner of Indian Affairs approved of punishing the guilty. 35

The Indians in September resumed their depredations in earnest. Comanches and Kiowas made a dash at Fort Dodge on September third, killing four soldiers and wounding seven- 36 teen before being driven off. A Mexican wagon train was attacked on the Santa Fe Trail near Fort Dodge by Cheyenne and Arapahoes. Sixteen of the Mexicans were reported killed 37 and scalped. Farther north, along the Smoky Hill and South

Platte, the Cheyennes pursued their methods of previous years. Great excitement prevailed in Denver, and Governor Hall of Colorado organized a volunteer company to protect³⁸ the stage lines.

On September seventh, General Sheridan ordered Sully to invade the region south of the Arkansas to make war on the families and stock of the Cheyennes and their allies. At nearly the same time, Colonel George A. Forsyth was ordered to operate against the Cheyennes in the vicinity of Fort Wallace. Forsyth headed an organization of frontier scouts which was formed on August twenty-fourth by authority of General Sheridan. "The formation of such companies was by order of Congress, although that body refused to enlarge the regular military establishment."³⁹ The scouts were all experienced plainsmen and buffalo hunters who had been recruited⁴⁰ at Forts Harker and Wallace by Lieutenant Fred Beecher.

Scouts had reported to Sheridan that a band of Indians, not exceeding two hundred fifty, was encamped on the western frontier of Kansas. The Indians attacked a wagon train near Sheridan on the Smoky Hill Route and fled northward. Forsyth's company at once left Fort Wallace in pursuit of the raiders. After six days marching they camped on Arickaree Creek in North-eastern Colorado. On the morning of the seventeenth the camp was attacked by a large force of Cheyennes and Sioux. For six days the little band withstood both the warriors and slow starvation until rescued by

Colonel Carpenter and the Tenth Cavalry on September twenty-second.⁴¹ The conflict is generally known as the Battle of Beecher's Island in honor of Lieutenant Beecher, who died there.

Numerous contradictory accounts have been written of this battle. Estimates of the number of Indians engaged vary from four hundred fifty to two thousand, while statistics on the number of Indian dead and wounded have ranged over a similarly divergent scale. Forsyth numbered the Indians at approximately four hundred fifty and reported that at least thirty-five were killed and many more wounded.⁴² Governor Crawford estimated the Indians at eight hundred.⁴³ Newspaper accounts of the battle stated that there were from six hundred to seven hundred Indians well armed with Spencer carbines and heavy rifles. Stories written by participants in the battle differ considerably, although all agree that the Indian casualties were heavy. Tom Murphy, one of Forsyth's scouts, writing years afterwards, said that it was impossible to tell in the confusion of battle how many Indians fell. In 1870 Mr. Murphy met Phil McCloskey, a trader to the Comanches, who had been with the Indians before and after the battle and had heard them discussing it. McCloskey told Murphy that three hundred sixty Indians were killed on the Arickaree.⁴⁴ Another scout, Louis McLaughlin, believed that the Indian death rate must have been heavy, since sixty-eight Cheyenne bodies were found by Carpenter's troops on their way to rescue Forsyth. McLaughlin furthermore

states that more Sioux than Cheyennes participated in the battle and that they lost more heavily than did their southern allies.⁴⁵ The highest statistics encountered were printed in a Kansas newspaper of comparatively recent times. This paper placed the number of Indians engaged in the battle at two thousand and estimated the dead at seven to eight hundred.⁴⁶ Standing alone against this array of figures is George Bird Grinnell's account. Mr. Grinnell suggests that stories of the battle written by the white participants are colored by their own imaginations. The Indian accounts to him are much more reliable. According to the Cheyenne version, which Grinnell relates, there were about six hundred Indians in the battle and only nine killed. The Cheyennes have even gone so far as to name the Indians who fell.⁴⁷

While it seems almost impossible to decide between such conflicting statements, a bit of logic may help solve the problem. Obviously the Indians must have numbered between four hundred fifty and eight hundred, since most of the estimates range thereabouts. It is infringing upon a person's credulity to state that several hundred Indians fell in the conflict. Equally ridiculous is it to maintain that fifty sharp-shooting plainsmen, armed with seven shot repeaters could kill only nine Indians in six days of battle and siege. As a consequence, until some better proof to the contrary can be furnished, the official report of Colonel Forsyth sounds most plausible. The chief value of Forsyth's victory is that it broke up a large concentration of Indians which

otherwise might have done considerable damage to overland travel and the frontier settlements in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.

While Forsyth and his men were on the march toward the Arickaree, preparations were being made in Kansas for a strong offensive against the Indian strongholds to the south. In order to invade the Indian Country with any sizeable force it was necessary to relieve many of the regulars who were engaged in patrol and scout duty. To meet this need, the First Frontier Battalion was organized from the militia of Kansas. For some time Governor Crawford had been urging General Sheridan to accept a battalion of militia for frontier duty, but up to September eleventh his offers had been rejected.⁴⁸ On September ninth Sheridan sent a long telegram to Crawford announcing Sully's movements south of the Arkansas and once more refusing the militia battalion. Sheridan said that he was not yet convinced that there was a necessity for such troops, but that if he discovered his regulars were insufficient he would call upon Crawford for aid. In the meantime he asked that the people of Kansas have more patience and their Indian troubles would be settled permanently. It was impossible, Sheridan added, to protect every house and person on the frontier. Small parties of whites who carelessly exposed themselves to danger would have to take the consequences.⁴⁹

Sheridan apparently changed his mind about the militia

battalion following fresh Indian disturbances, since he finally acquiesced to Crawford's plan. On September eleventh the Governor had telegraphed Sheridan as follows:

"Will you issue to me five hundred stand of Spencer carbines with accoutrements and ammunition? If so, and you will supply rations, I will at once organize a battalion of picked men well mounted to guard the border from the Republican to the Arkansas."

Sheridan responded with his acceptance, stating that Crawford's proposition would enable him to use seven companies of regulars who had been patrolling the frontier. Adjutant General McAfee on September fifteenth informed Governor Crawford that Sheridan would order the guns from Fort Leavenworth and sixty days rations from Fort Harker to be sent immediately to Salina, where the battalion was to organize. He added that Sheridan wanted the battalion in the field as soon as possible, since the seven companies of regular soldiers were needed on the Plains at once.

The next day, Governor Crawford issued his proclamation for volunteers. Instructions were also telegraphed to recruiting officers. Organization plans called for five companies of cavalry to enlist for three months' service with possibilities of only sixty days' service required. Each recruit was expected to furnish his own horse. Guns and ammunition were to be supplied by the United States through

General Sheridan. After assembling at Salina, the headquarters for arms, supplies, and enlistments, the companies were ordered to their respective stations. One company each was stationed in the following localities: Lake Sibley,⁵⁴ Solomon Valley, Salina, Marion Center, and Topeka. The Topeka company was evidently held in reserve to reinforce the troops at other points.

The period from September sixteenth to twenty-eighth was spent in preparation. Before the battalion was fully recruited and outfitted, a call came from Sheridan to send the first company organized to the southwest frontier. Reports had reached Sheridan that a war party of Cheyennes and⁵⁵ Arapahoes had crossed the Arkansas east of the Great Bend. Shortly afterwards Crawford was notified by Sheridan that⁵⁶ the supposed Indian raid was a false report. On the twenty-sixth Sheridan wired Crawford to relieve his troops on the⁵⁷ Saline and Republican as soon as possible. Two days later the first militia company marched away to the southwest. The others soon followed, and assumed their respective positions along the line of patrol, which extended from Nebraska south to Wichita. Good work was performed by this frontier patrol. No Indian depredations were committed during its sixty days of service except for one small raid on the Solomon in which four men were killed, one wounded, and a woman taken captive.

After the sixty days' rations had been consumed,

Adjutant General McAfee asked Sheridan if he wanted the battalion disbanded. Sheridan replied that he would ask authority for more rations. Soon after, however, he left Fort Hays to take the field against the Indians. Upon referring the question to General Sherman, McAfee received a refusal; consequently the Frontier Battalion was ordered home by Colonel McAfee in the latter part of November. Many of the soldiers were wholly destitute of winter clothing and both horses and men were near starvation when mustered out.⁵⁸ It was really unnecessary to keep the men in service any longer, since by November the Indians had practically withdrawn from the State and Sheridan was carrying the war to them in a winter campaign. Many of the men in the battalion, however, seemed to think otherwise. On November twenty-sixth, Governor Green, who had succeeded Crawford, received a petition from members of the battalion near Salina. Permission was asked of the Governor to retain one hundred men for a period of thirty more days with power to push the enemy outside the State. The petition further requested that they be rationed by the State and allowed to retain their arms. The reason given for this desire to extend their time of service was that four hundred Cheyennes and Arapahoes were encamped in the Saline Valley.⁵⁹

Colonel McAfee, in order to fulfill this request, called upon the post adjutant at Fort Harker to issue more rations. That officer replied on December fourth with a refusal, stating that the issue of rations to state militia

was unauthorized and could not be complied with. State officials seemed willing to keep the militia out as long as the United States Government paid for the rations. When, on the other hand, the burden of rationing the troops fell to the lot of the state treasury, the Indian danger at once became negligible and the militia was withdrawn.

It is extremely doubtful if the Indians reported on the Saline were Cheyennes and Arapahoes. It is even possible that there were no Indians in that region at the time. One month previous, Major Jenness of the Frontier Battalion had reported that the only hostile Indians remaining in Northwestern Kansas were the Sioux on the Republican River, all Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands having gone into winter quarters. ⁶¹

The last big Indian fight of the year in Kansas occurred on October eighteenth, when Colonel Carpenter and the Tenth Cavalry exchanged blows with a large party of Cheyennes and Arapahoes near Buffalo Station sixty miles west of Fort Hays. Nine Indians were killed and thirty wounded.

⁶²
Carpenter's losses were three wounded. On the next to the last day of October, Indians derailed six cars on a Kansas Pacific excursion train near Grinnell, but no one was hurt. ⁶³
Colored troops charged on the Indians and drove them away.

Sheridan's winter campaign against the Cheyennes had been foreshadowed on September eleventh, when he called upon Governor Crawford for the Frontier Battalion. Shortly afterwards it was predicted by General Sherman in the following

prophetic statement: "When winter starves their (the Indians') ponies, they will want a truce and shan't have it, unless the civil influence compels me again as it did last winter."⁶⁴ General Sully's September campaign south of the Arkansas had not succeeded in crushing the Indians. In fact, Sully himself was hard pressed before he managed to get back to Fort Dodge. General Hazen at Fort Larned attempted on September nineteenth and twentieth to come to terms with the Kiowas and Comanches; nevertheless he failed to secure either peace or their removal to their reservation.⁶⁵ The Indians "worked" Hazen, as they previously had hoodwinked Sully, and obtained arms and ammunition with which they promptly took the warpath.⁶⁶ Continued Indian depredations after Sheridan had ordered the Indians out of Kansas exasperated the military authorities, Sherman finally authorizing Sheridan to proceed on a winter offensive.

On October eighth, Sheridan informed Governor Crawford of his recent orders and called upon Kansas for a regiment of volunteer cavalry to serve six months.⁶⁷ The Indian Peace Commission having sustained the war policy, military preparations could go forward without fear of interruption.⁶⁸ Sheridan's plans for the Kansas volunteers were that the cavalry should muster in Topeka and march overland to Camp Supply in Indian Territory, where they were to unite with Sheridan's forces from Forts Hays and Dodge. Upon receipt of Sheridan's request, Governor Crawford immediately issued a proclamation calling for volunteers.

The response was instantaneous. Letters and telegrams came from all over the State offering services of officers and men. ⁶⁹ On October twentieth, Company A was mustered in at Topeka. Other companies were rapidly added to the ranks until the regiment was complete. On November fourth, Governor Crawford resigned his office to take command of the expedition. ⁷⁰ The next day the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry began the long trek across the Plains to meet Sheridan. The regiment reached Camp Supply on November twenty-sixth after suffering great hardships. Freezing weather and lack of food killed many of their horses; consequently nearly half the regiment finished the campaign as infantry. Before the Nineteenth arrived, General Custer with his Seventh Cavalry had advanced southward to the Washita River and destroyed ⁷¹ Black Kettle's Cheyenne village.

Custer's work on the Washita was but a part of the campaign plan of Sheridan. The entire plan called for the concerted operation of three separate columns of troops from Fort Hays, Fort Lyon and Fort Bascom (New Mexico). Colonel Evans with six cavalry troops and two infantry companies was to leave Fort Bascom and work down the Canadian River. General Carr and seven troops of Fifth Cavalry were scheduled to march southeast from Fort Lyon to the North Canadian. Sheridan with the main force expected to strike the Indian villages along the Washita River. The three columns planned to converge and punish the Indians in a series of decisive engagements. The aims of the campaign were to force the

Indians on their reservations, and, if that failed, to show them that they would have no security winter or summer unless they respected the laws of peace and humanity.⁷²

The Battle of the Washita has received so much publicity, that only the main facts of the affair need be told. On the morning of November twenty-seventh, after having followed the trail of a returning war party, Custer's men surrounded the sleeping village. At dawn the charge was sounded and the cavalry swept down upon the surprised Indians, driving them from their tepees. The Cheyennes never had a chance and were badly beaten. Black Kettle, their chief, fell at the first onslaught. Custer's men destroyed the village and killed the captured pony herd. Unknown to Custer, the entire valley below the Cheyenne village was full of Indians--Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches. These Indians, hearing the sounds of battle, came to the rescue of their Cheyenne friends. Seeing such overwhelming numbers arriving, Custer very prudently withdrew and marched back to Camp Supply. Statistics of the battle are greatly at variance. In his report Custer stated that one hundred three warriors were killed and fifty-three women and children captured. The Indians themselves told General Grierson in 1869 that the Cheyenne loss was thirteen men, sixteen women, and nine children.⁷³ Custer's own losses were nineteen killed and thirteen wounded.⁷⁴

Much controversy has existed since the Washita battle

as to whether or not Black Kettle's band deserved what befell them. Sheridan himself thought that Black Kettle deserved what he got, since he had freely encouraged the Saline and Solomon raids, even though he did not personally participate in them.⁷⁵ In his report to the Secretary of War, Sheridan referred to the Cheyenne Chief in the following uncomplimentary fashion:

"Black Kettle . . . a worn-out and worthless old cypher, was said to be friendly; but when I sent him word to come to Dodge before any of the troops had commenced operations, saying that I would feed and protect himself and family, he refused . . . He was also with the band on Walnut Creek, where they made their medicine, or held their devilish incantations previous to the party setting out to⁷⁶ massacre the settlers."

Other references to Black Kettle have been more kindly. Mr. Windom of Minnesota during debate in the House of Representatives mentioned "Black Kettle and his friendly band".⁷⁷ George Bird Grinnell cites Black Kettle as a fine example of a patriot and has eulogized him in these words:

"Black Kettle was a striking example of a consistently friendly Indian, who, because he was friendly and because his whereabouts was usually known, was punished for the acts of people whom it was⁷⁸ supposed he could control."

J. R. Mead, writing in the Wichita Eagle many years after the battle, called the Washita affair a massacre of innocent Indians. The writer declared that Black Kettle was not a hostile and never had been, that General Hazen had given the Chief a letter guaranteeing him and his band protection, and that when William Griffenstein, a friendly trader and afterwards mayor of Wichita, accused Sheridan of striking a camp of friendly Indians he was ordered out of the Indian Territory by Sheridan and threatened with hanging if he returned.⁷⁹

The best statement on the mooted question had been offered by George Bent, the half-breed Cheyenne. Bent said that Black Kettle himself was friendly, but that the Cheyenne raiders on the Saline and Solomon joined Black Kettle's camp making it appear as though the band were hostile.⁸⁰ Little Raven, an Arapahoe chief, testified on April 9, 1869, before General Grierson that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes did not understand where their reservation was located. The Arapahoe chieftain thought Custer's attack was due to the fact that the Indians were off their reservation.⁸¹

On December seventh, Sheridan's entire force left Camp Supply and advanced to the Washita. Upon their approach the Indians broke camp and fled, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes retreating southward, while the Kiowas and Comanches headed for the Wichita Mountains. Sheridan followed the latter group after having thoroughly explored the site of the Washita battle field.⁸² The expedition overtook the fleeing

Indians on December seventeenth near Fort Cobb. While preparing to strike the Kiowa village, Sheridan was stopped by a message sent from Fort Cobb by General Hazen. The latter informed Sheridan that the Indians had surrendered to the Interior Department and that they were not hostile. ⁸³ Once more the conflict of authority between the War and Interior Departments prevented decisive military action. Sheridan was very angry at Hazen for interfering, because he believed ⁸⁴ that the Kiowas richly deserved a severe trouncing. Hazen, of course, was acting under orders, since he had been detailed by both the War Department and the Indian Bureau to take charge of the arrangements for bringing about peace and putting the Kiowa and Comanche Indians on their reservation. The difficulty was that Hazen's and Sheridan's instructions were not in harmony. Hazen had regarded the Cheyennes and Arapahoes only as being hostile. He had therefore refused to allow them to come into Fort Cobb and make peace, although Black Kettle and a delegation had appeared for that purpose ⁸⁵ shortly before Custer's attack.

Although professing friendship, the wily Kiowas and Comanches endeavored to escape Sheridan and flee southward. By a bit of stratagem Sheridan prevented this and managed to accomplish a complete surrender. Sheridan's method was quite simple but effective. It consisted of capturing Santanta and Lone Wolf, the principal Kiowa chiefs, and threatening to hang them. ⁸⁶

The backbone of the Indian rebellion was broken on December twenty-fifth, when Colonel Evans completely crushed the last hostile band of Comanches on the Canadian River. This had its effect upon the Cheyennes and Arapahoes who were still at large. At midnight on December thirty-first, a delegation of chiefs from these tribes came into Fort Cobb begging for peace. They reported that their tribes were in mourning for their losses--their people starving--ponies dying--dogs all eaten up--no buffalo. Sheridan accepted their unconditional surrender and decided to punish them justly. "I can scarcely make error in any punishment awarded, for⁸⁷ all have blood upon their hands," he firmly asserted.

The year thus ended with fair prospects of the Indian wars in Kansas coming to an end in the near future. In the meantime Governor Green of Kansas had appealed to General Sully to place a permanent patrol of troops on the Saline and Solomon. Sully answered by sending one hundred fifty regulars to the region and promised to keep men there in the⁸⁸ future. No outbreaks occurred in that section until the following spring. The close of the year found the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry in good condition with forty-six of-⁸⁹ ficers and one thousand one hundred twelve men on duty.

Part Two, 1869

Throughout the winter months of the new year Sheridan's campaign continued. By the end of March the Indians had all been forced upon their reservations and the war was practically over so far as the southern tribes were concerned. There still remained in Kansas the danger of depredations from the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne and Dog Soldier bands who usually spent part of each year hunting buffalo along the Smoky Hill and Republican. As a consequence, renewed outbreaks occurred and Governor Harvey was compelled to follow the example of Crawford in calling out a militia battalion for frontier duty. Pawnees and Osages also gave some trouble. In general, though, the Indian raids did not compare in either duration or intensity with those of 1864-1868.

Sheridan remained camped at Fort Cobb for several weeks after which he moved farther south to the Wichita Mountains. Near the latter he established Fort Sill. The Cheyennes had not remained true to their peace pledge. Part of them and nearly all of the Arapahoes gave themselves up, but Little Robe and the remainder of the tribe refused to come in. With this band were two captive white women, victims of the Saline-Solomon raids of the previous summer and autumn. Sheridan and Custer were especially anxious to recover these unfortunate captives.

On March 2, 1869, the Nineteenth Kansas and the Seventh Cavalry left Fort Sill under command of General Custer and Colonel Horace L. Moore, who had succeeded Governor Crawford in February. The object of the expedition was to recapture the captive women and force Little Robe's band into submission. After a terrific pursuit, the Cheyennes were overtaken on March twentieth near the Staked Plains of Texas. Instead of destroying the Indians, as could have easily been done, Custer used diplomacy in order to recapture the women. By a repetition of Sheridan's "hang man" stunt, Custer frightened the chiefs into ordering the release of the women. Little Robe's band then surrendered and returned to Camp
90
Supply.

This affair closed the winter campaign. General Sheridan was called to Washington to become Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri in place of Sherman, who had been appointed General-in-Chief of the United States Army upon Grant's vacating that office for the Presidency. In his report of the campaign, Sheridan was able to say that all objectives had been accomplished. This meant that punishment had been inflicted, property destroyed, the Indians disabused of the idea that winter would bring security, and all tribes south of the Platte forced upon their reservations.
91

When General Schofield succeeded Sheridan as Commander of the Department of the Missouri on March 20, 1869, the

winter campaign had practically ended and the troops were
⁹²
 en route to their ordinary stations. The Nineteenth Kansas
 was ordered to Fort Hays on March thirty-first and mustered
 out April eighteenth. Only one man of the regiment was
⁹³
 killed in service.

Indian affairs were also fairly well settled. The
 Arapahoes were located at Camp Supply in complete submission.
 Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches were on their reservation.
 The Cheyennes had promised to make their submission in a
 short time. Dissension was rife in the ranks of the Chey-
 ennes. The Dog Soldier bands under Tall Bull refused to
 make peace, whereas the majority of the tribe had tasted
 enough of war and favored accepting a reservation. As a
 consequence the tribe divided, Tall Bull and two hundred
 fifty warriors with their families joining the Sioux and
 Northern Cheyennes on the Republican, while Little Robe and
 the greater part of the tribe remained in Indian Territory
 and were ultimately provided with a reservation in the vi-
⁹⁴
 cinity of Camp Supply.

Tall Bull and his cohorts on the Republican River were
 not content to let matters rest. On May twenty-first, Sioux
 and Cheyennes made a raid in Republic County killing thir-
⁹⁵
 teen persons and taking two women and a child captive. On
 the twenty-ninth, Indians attacked the Kansas Pacific Rail-
 road near Fossil Creek. Two miles of track were torn up, a
⁹⁶
 train was ditched and traffic held up for nearly a day. The

next day the Saline Valley was a victim of a raid nearly identical to that of May twenty-first. Thirteen people were⁹⁷ killed and wounded and two more women were captured.

General Custer immediately left Fort Hays in pursuit, but failed to catch the Indians. It remained for Major-General Carr to administer the final blow to Tall Bull's band. Carr with his Fifth Cavalry had been operating under General Augur in the Platte Division of the Department of the Missouri. On July eleventh, Carr with seven companies of cavalry and one hundred fifty Pawnee scouts under Major North completely destroyed Tall Bull's village at Summit Springs, Colorado. Tall Bull was killed and his band nearly⁹⁸ annihilated. Hearing of this, the Cheyennes in Indian Territory hastened to Fort Supply to make peace. The remnants of Tall Bull's tribe drifted in later and begged for peace. As a result there were no hostile Indians on the Plains of⁹⁹ Kansas and Colorado.

While the Nineteenth Kansas was pursuing Little Robe's band in Texas, Indian affairs in Kansas were not entirely quiet. In January General Sully warned Governor Harvey that hostile Indians had recently been seen near Hays. Sully believed that the exposed settlers should be warned. He added that all of his spare cavalry was engaged in patrol duty on¹⁰⁰ the Saline and Solomon but that more had been applied for. Governor Harvey accordingly warned the settlements and ordered various frontiersmen to raise squads of scouts for

defense. Colonel McAfee hastened towards the frontier to
 make arrangements for supplying these scouts with rations. ¹⁰¹
 Indians were reported in February on the Smoky Hill west of
 Junction City. ¹⁰²

Adjutant General McKeever of Fort Leavenworth on February
 twenty-seventh issued three thousand rounds of ammunition
 to Governor Harvey for distribution among frontier
 settlers. ¹⁰³

The Kansas State Legislature took action in February
 and passed two measures for frontier protection. The first
 of these authorized the Governor to call into immediate
 active service not more than two hundred state militia to
 be stationed at the most exposed points. To meet the expenses
 of this group of militia an act was passed providing
 for the issuance and sale of state bonds. Both of these
 acts were approved by Governor Harvey on February twenty-
 sixth. ¹⁰⁴

After the Indian raids of May and June, the militia was
 once more called into service. Four companies and a detachment
 were mustered in during July and stationed on the
 northwestern frontier. The Second Frontier Battalion, as it
 was called, served until November twentieth, when the final
 muster-out occurred. Although originally organized with a
 roll of eleven officers and three hundred enlisted men, the
 number was gradually reduced as the Indian danger diminished.
 Only one hundred fifteen remained at the final muster. ¹⁰⁵ The

four companies were located as follows: Company A at Spillman Creek; Saline Valley; Company B at Plum Creek, Solomon Valley; Company C at Fisher Creek, Solomon Valley; Company D at the forks of Beaver Creek and Republican River. The troops patrolled the border line effectively, but never came into contact with any large numbers of Indians. This was the last militia Battalion ever called out to defend the
 106
 Kansas frontier.

Before the organization of the Second Frontier Battalion, Adjutant General Moorhouse called into service several companies of regular militia. These were ordered by Governor Harvey to cooperate with the United States Cavalry on the Solomon River following an Indian attack near Minneapolis in June.
 107
 Light artillery from Fort Riley were also mounted and armed as cavalry at the request of the Governor.
 108
 The artillerymen performed quite efficiently.

Numerous complaints reached Governor Harvey concerning petty depredations of Pawnees, Otoes and Osages. One Junction City citizen wanted the "scalawag Pawnees and Otoes" to be warned to keep clear of all settlements during times of Indian hostility because all Indians looked alike to white men and many of these "friendlies" were being killed as a
 109
 result. Cowley County settlers petitioned Harvey to protect them from Osages who had driven off stock, burned a store, confiscated settlers claims, and in general acted quite arrogant toward the white man in the region.
 110
 Osages were also

driving settlers off the Osage Neutral Lands during the
 111
 year.

In order to repay in a measure the Kansas settlers who had suffered at the hands of the Indians, the State Legislature in 1869 passed an act providing for a commission to investigate and allow claims of citizens for damages done by
 112
 Indians in 1867-8. The commission visited Ellsworth, Saline, Ottawa, Cloud, and Mitchell Counties and allowed a total of one hundred twenty claims for an aggregate of \$58,944.34. The number of offenses charged to various Indian tribes were as follows: Cheyenne, seventy seven; Sioux, thirty-four; Pawnee, fifteen; Kiowa, nine; Arapahoe, seven; Comanche, one. In its tour of investigation the commission found many claims abandoned and fields deserted. In concluding its report the commission urged that all Indian tribes be excluded from the State, adding that until such measures were taken there could be no permanent feeling of security on the
 113
 frontier.

The claims audited by the commission were referred to Congress for final payment. Kansas in addition carried on some relief work in cooperation with the United States Army. In February, General Sully rationed the destitute settlers of the Saline and Solomon regions and then informed Governor
 114
 Harvey of his investigations. General Sherman also sent an inspector to the locality who in turn reported to the Kansas governor. In this report, General N. H. Davis, Assistant

Inspector General of the Department of the Missouri; announced that the Government had provided for the immediate wants of the settlers by issuing food and clothing. The settlers, however, were in great need of seed wheat which the military authorities were unable to furnish; consequently he appealed to Harvey to furnish it. As a result, the Kansas State Legislature on March first passed an act authorizing the Governor to purchase and distribute \$15,000 worth of seed wheat to the destitute frontier citizens. The counties affected by the act were Clay, Cloud, Ellsworth, Lincoln, Marion, Mitchell, McPherson, Jewell, Ottawa, Republic, Saline, and Washington.

War Department statistics for the years 1868-9 indicate that these two years were the worst in the history of plains warfare in the Department of the Missouri. Indian depredations for the period ran as follows: one hundred fifty eight people murdered; sixteen wounded; forty-one scalped; fourteen women outraged; one man, four women, and seven children captured; twenty-four houses attacked and burned; twelve stage coaches attacked and impeded; four wagon trains destroyed; eighteen Indians killed in these attacks. Statistics on conflicts between the Indians and the military were as follows: number of engagements, eleven; total number of soldiers killed, thirty-five; total number of soldiers wounded, forty-nine; Indians killed, two hundred ninety-one; Indians wounded, two hundred fifty. With the

close of this period the worst Indian troubles in Kansas had ended, although the years that followed brought their toll of death and destruction to the venturesome pioneers of the Jayhawk State.

CHAPTER VI

THE INDIAN QUESTION IN CONGRESS AND IN KANSAS

From 1864 to 1870 few greater problems confronted Congress and the Executive Department than the complex Indian question. Both departments of government were torn by conflicting forces, one of which demanded that the Indian problem be settled by peaceful methods while the other could see no solution except by the use of force. In the Executive Department the conflict raged between two subsidiary divisions, the Department of the Interior and the War Department. Administration of Indian affairs was in the hands of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Interior Department, which had supervision over all Indian superintendents and agents, and authority to distribute annuities. Whenever Indian hostilities broke out, however, the War Department was compelled to intervene until they could be put down. As a consequence, the authority of the two departments overlapped and therefore clashed. Military programs were constantly interfered with by the Indian Bureau with disastrous results both to the military and to the frontier settlements. On the other hand, the military people undoubtedly contributed to many unnecessary Indian wars. The War Department desired to regain the control over Indian Affairs which it had exercised prior to 1841. The Indian Bureau for various

reasons, both selfish and otherwise, refused to be transferred.

This inter-departmental war spread into Congress, where pressure was brought to bear by friends of the War Department to bring about the proposed transfer. Congress divided on the question. Both Senate and House hotly debated the proposition at intervals over a period of several years, finally allowing the Interior Department to retain the Indian Bureau. In general the Senate favored the status quo, while the House constantly passed bills providing for changing the location of the Bureau.

Public opinion entered the contest, the East as a rule upholding the policy of the Indian Bureau while the West denounced it in the strongest terms. Congressional legislation varied in accordance with changing situations, but on the whole it was tempered more by the peace party than by the war party. In pursuance of its policy to make peace with the Indians, Congress in 1867 created a peace commission which attempted to settle the Indian problem on the Plains. No serious resistance, however, was offered to the War Department when, in 1868-9, it launched a decisive military campaign against the Indians.

The Indian Bureau in 1865 attempted to establish harmony with the War Department by a division of authority. Commissioner Cooley issued a circular to all superintendents and agents announcing that, in its relation with hostile

Indians, the Interior Department would subordinate its actions to the War Department. Agents, however, were instructed to perform their regular official duties in governing friendly Indians.¹ Had this policy been carried out as planned much trouble might have been avoided.

The difficulty was that hostile Indians could seldom be distinguished from friendly Indians due to the fact that the Red Men were alternately warlike and peaceful. Thus in the Hancock War of 1867 the military authorities assumed that the Indians were hostile, whereas the Indian agents were positive of their friendliness. Indian Bureau officials were quite critical of Hancock and branded as a mistake his whole course of action. Superintendent Thomas Murphy of the Central Superintendency at the time expressed a very decided wish that the military authorities would leave the management² of Indian affairs to the Indian agents.

Again in 1868, trouble arose between the rival departments over the distribution of arms and ammunition to the Indians. Interior Department officials had authorized Major Wyncoop to issue the guns and bullets to the eager braves on that fateful August day at Fort Larned.³ Soldiers hired by the War Department were then forced to face the Interior Department's guns in the Indian campaigns which ensued as a result of the Saline-Solomon raids.

After years of discord, the War Department and Interior Department finally worked out a cooperative Indian policy.

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1869 announced that a perfect accord had been reached. The Indian policy of the future, as defined in the report, provided that: (1) The Indians should be secured in their legal rights, (2) When practicable they were to be located upon reservations, (3) They should be assisted in agricultural pursuits and the arts of civilized life, (4) All Indians who refused to come into their reservations should be subject to control of the military authorities and should be treated as either friendly or hostile as the situation demanded.⁴ The last point was especially important, since it gave a definite basis for determining the respective jurisdiction of the two departments.

Congress, in attempting to analyze the Indian problem, created in 1865 the Joint Special Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes. The purpose of the act, as explained by its proponents when first introduced as Senate Resolution 89, was to investigate the alleged corruption of Indian agents and the alleged causing of unnecessary Indian wars by military authorities.⁵ When the bill went to the House it was amended by providing that the Indian Bureau at Washington should also be investigated by the committee.⁶ The two Houses then appointed a conference committee to iron out their differences on the bill. The conference committee accepted the House amendment, after which both Houses adopted the report of the committee. President Lincoln signed the bill on March 3, 1865.

The Joint Special Committee was authorized to sit during recess of Congress and to report its findings to Congress at its next session. The complete report of the committee was published in 1867. Its main decisions were:

- (1) The Indians are rapidly decreasing in numbers, due to disease, wars, cruel treatment by the whites, unwise governmental policy and steady westward advance of the white man.
- (2) In a large majority of cases Indian wars are caused by aggressions of lawless white men.
- (3) Loss of hunting grounds and destruction of game is a big cause for decay.
- (4) The Indian Bureau should remain in the Department of the Interior.
- (5) In order that abuses of Indian administration may be corrected the Indian lands should be divided into five inspection districts with a board of inspection in each district. The board would be empowered to check up on all questions of Indian administration and report at stated intervals to Congress.

In order to put the ideas of the committee into legislation, Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, chairman of both the Joint Special Committee and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, introduced Senate Bill 204 which provided for the annual inspection of Indian Affairs by five inspection boards as heretofore mentioned. After long debate the bill passed the Senate on March 19, 1866 by a vote of nineteen to sixteen.

The House failed to take action on the bill until the following session when it amended by striking out the

entire contents of the Senate bill and substituting the provision that the Indian Bureau should be transferred to the War Department. When the House amendment was returned to the Senate for concurrence it was decisively defeated.⁹ A deadlock ensued, for the breaking of which conference committees were appointed from both houses. The conference committee met but failed to agree, so asked to be discharged¹⁰ from further consideration of the bill.

The Senate attitude throughout this contest was hostile to the proposal to transfer the Indian Bureau. During debate on the House amendment, Senator Doolittle stated that the Committee on Indian Affairs of both Senate and House and the Joint Special Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes were all unanimous in their desire to support the original bill, but were also unanimous in their desire to¹¹ defeat the House amendment.

Congress' next attempt to carry out recommendations of the Joint Special Committee took place in the special session of the Fortieth Congress in the summer of 1867. The seriousness of the Indian situation on the Plains at the time was one of the reasons for the calling of the special session. With the peace party dominant in both houses, legislation was rushed through providing for the creation of a peace commission to make treaties with all the hostile tribes between the Mississippi and the Rockies. The functions of the Peace Commission as stated in the act of July

20, 1867 were as follows: (1) To restore peace upon the Plains. (2) To secure as far as possible the frontier settlements and the unimpeded right of way for the Pacific railroads. (3) To recommend a permanent Indian policy.

The commission accordingly went to the Plains in the autumn of 1867 and concluded agreements with both the north-¹²ern and southern plains Indians. The treaties in general contained the three essential objectives of the commission. In its report to Congress of January 7, 1868, the Peace Commission recommended the following changes in Indian policy: (1) Revision of laws governing relations of the two races. (2) Indian affairs should not be transferred to the War Department. A temporary transfer to the War Department of jurisdiction over hostiles, however, was suggested. (3) Congress should get rid of incompetent Indian officials. (4) A new department of Indian affairs should be created. (5) Territorial governors should treat the Indians more fairly. (6) No governor or legislature in either state or territory should be permitted to call out and equip troops for the purpose of carrying on war with the Indians. (7) Traders should all be required to receive permits from Indian Bureau officers in order to enter the Indian trade. (8) New provisions should be made which positively direct the military authorities to remove white persons who persist¹³ in trespassing on Indian reservations.

Efforts by the enemies of the Peace Commission to

dissolve it failed. On the day that Congress passed the act creating the commission, a bill was introduced into the Senate for its dissolution. The Senate killed the bill by referring it to the Committee on Indian Affairs.¹⁴ Apparently Congress was in sympathy with the work of the Peace Commission, because a bill appropriating \$150,000 to enable it to carry on its work passed in July, 1868, with little opposition in either house.¹⁵

Numerous attempts were made to put through legislation which would bring about the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department. The first of these arose in the Senate on May 16, 1866, when Senator Stewart of Nevada introduced a bill for that purpose. It was referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs and promptly lost.¹⁶ The second attempt was born the same year in the Senate in the form of an amendment to the annual Indian appropriation bill. Senator Sherman of Ohio, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and brother to General W. T. Sherman, introduced the amendment to H. R. 387. A great debate took place between Sherman and Stewart on the one side and Doolittle on the other. In the end Doolittle won out, and the Indian Bureau for the time was saved from transfer. The Senate rejected Sherman's amendment by a twenty-one to twelve vote.¹⁷ The third and most dangerous attempt to bring about the transfer took place in 1867 when the House of Representatives amended Senate Bill 204 by inserting the well-known provision.¹⁸

Not to be discouraged by reverses, the House in December, 1868, made another determined attempt to put across the transfer of the bureau. Garfield of Ohio, Chairman of the House Military Committee, introduced a bill, H. R. 1482, for that purpose, and immediately called for the previous question which passed, thus limiting debate on the main motion. Although Windom of Minnesota, a member of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, made a valiant fight against the bill, he was outvoted 116 to 33.¹⁹ When the bill reached the Senate it was killed in the Committee on Indian Affairs.²⁰ A final attempt failed in the House in January, 1869, when Garfield's effort to amend an appropriation bill, by adding a section transferring the Indian Bureau to the War Department, was ruled out of order.²¹ When the bill was sent to the Senate for approval, Senator Stewart of Nevada amended it by adding a clause identical to that offered by Garfield in the House. Stewart's amendment was lost by a 36-9 vote chiefly because²² it was regarded as inappropriate at the time.

This ended the efforts of the friends of the War Department. It is clearly apparent by the debate and voting on these various bills that the Senate consistently maintained its defense of the Indian Bureau, while the House gradually diminished its opposition to the bureau. Both houses desired an improvement in Indian relations, but could not become convinced that the removal of the Indian Bureau from one department to another would appreciably improve the situation.

From beginning to end of the great contest over Indian policy, Kansas remained in the war party. Governor, state legislature, press and public opinion were united solidly in demanding a change in Indian administration. The Kansas delegation in Congress therefore was compelled to enter the fight on the side of their state. Kansas was represented in the House during the period by Sidney Clark of Lawrence, while Senators Pomeroy and Ross championed the Sunflower State in the upper chamber. Senator Lane's death in 1865 occurred early in the struggle; consequently the chief interest lies in the actions and opinions of the other gentlemen mentioned.

Senator Pomeroy in 1865 submitted a resolution in the Senate which provided: (1) That the Government change its magnanimous and conciliatory Indian policy and adopt vigorous and decisive measures against hostile Indians. (2) That the routes of communication to the Pacific should be kept open. This resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on December 6, 1865. On July 27, 1866, the committee was discharged from further consideration of the resolution. Later in the same session when the Senate was debating the House amendment to Senate Bill 204, Pomeroy opposed the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department. In the course of his speech he said that he was not prepared to turn out the army to exterminate the Indians; furthermore he believed that white men precipitated most

Indian wars. When S. 204 was first presented in the Senate as a bill which represented the pet theories of the Joint Special Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes, both Pomeroy and Lane voted against it.²⁶ On the other hand, after the House had changed the entire content of the bill by its amendment,²⁷ Pomeroy voted against the bill as amended.

In the special session of 1867, when Congress was considering Senate Bill 136 for organizing the Peace Commission, Pomeroy favored the proposition. While he believed it to be only a temporary measure, he thought it was to the interest of the western country to secure peace.²⁸ The following session saw Pomeroy introducing a bill to transfer the Indian Bureau to the War Department by allowing the Freedman's Bureau to assume the duties of the Indian Bureau.²⁹ It is evident that Pomeroy had either changed his mind on the Indian question or that he was trying to please his constituency. The latter idea seems the more plausible. This is further carried out by the fact that the Kansas senator in 1869 voted against Senator Stewart's proposition to transfer the Indian Bureau,³⁰ and earlier in the session, introduced a bill to provide for the creation of a separate department of Indian affairs.³¹ It is most probable that Pomeroy's personal opinion was unfavorable to the war party, but that his position as a Senator from Kansas required him constantly to change his stand on the question.

The position of Senator Ross is not so difficult to

define. Ross was a personal friend of Governor Crawford, received his appointment to the Senate from Crawford, and maintained a consistent attitude as ardent advocate of frontier defense, and enemy of the Indian Bureau. Ross introduced numerous resolutions of the Kansas State Legislature into the Senate.³² It was Ross to whom Governor Crawford turned on June 29, 1867, after General Sherman had rejected his offer of volunteer cavalry.³³ Crawford poured out his bitter story in its entirety and appealed to Ross to convince Congress that "there is no such thing as peace (with the Indians) except by war".³⁴ In response to this appeal, Senator Ross amended the Peace Commission bill by a provision that the army should accept the services of mounted volunteers from states and territories of the West in order to suppress Indian hostilities.³⁵

In defense of his amendment, Senator Ross argued that the Peace Commission bill made no provision for frontier defense, that Indian depredations were increasing, that Kansas sought merely permission to protect herself, that the first duty of the nation was to protect the white race, and that war was the only method of bringing about peace with the Indian. Ross condemned both the Easterner's view of the Indian as a hero and the Westerner's idea that the Indian was a devil incarnate. The conflict, he said, was one between civilization and barbarism and that civilization must win.³⁶

Senator Ross assumed a somewhat different position in a

speech at Lawrence, Kansas, on November 5, 1867. Although condemning the treaty system in general and the Medicine Lodge Treaty in particular, he did not advocate making peace by means of war. Instead he suggested that the best possible solution for the Indian problem was the gradual localization of Indians upon reservations. To accomplish this end, the Senator stated, the Government must make a reasonable show of force. Military posts, he believed, should be increased both in number and size of garrison.

"After all," Senator Ross concluded, "it is not so much the manner in which the peace of the plains is to be secured, as the fact itself, in which the people of Kansas are most interested. What we all most ardently desire, is the immunity of our frontiers from the disturbances and devastations which have so effectually retarded
37
the settlement and development of the West."

Again in 1869, Senator Ross aided in the frontier defense of his state. In the autumn of the year, Indian depredations were renewed in Northwestern Kansas. Since the militia had been mustered out, Governor Harvey became apprehensive for the safety of the settlers. Senator Ross accordingly was appealed to and secured the promise of Sherman that United States troops would be sent to the region.
38

Of the entire Kansas delegation in Congress, Mr. Clarke maintained the most consistent attitude. He never changed

his position of antagonism toward the peace party. When an Indian appropriation bill was before the House in 1868, Clarke opposed it on the grounds that it provided for making appropriations to hostile tribes.³⁹ On March 3, 1868, he introduced a bill, H. R. 854, for the dissolution of the Peace Commission. The bill was referred to the Indian Committee but was never acted upon.⁴⁰

In 1869 Clarke agreed heartily with Garfield's efforts to get the Indian Bureau into the War Department. He stated in debate that public opinion in the West was almost unanimous in favor of the proposed transfer.⁴¹ In a lengthy speech in support of Garfield's measure, Clarke expressed his views plainly. The Indian question, he argued, was not a question of philanthropy, nor of laying the blame for aggression upon either whites or Indians. It was, however, he stated, a question of practical administration, that civilization had come into contact with the Indian but that civilization would march forward in spite of opposition. He therefore wanted civilization aided instead of being hindered by Congress.⁴²

Although the votes and speeches of the Kansas delegation in Congress are a good indication of the Kansas attitude toward the Indian question, a more thorough analysis can be obtained by turning to the state itself. Executive and legislative acts, press comments, and individual opinions best reflect what Kansas actually thought.

Previous chapters in this monograph have disclosed the attitude of the governors of Kansas toward the entire Indian problem. Governor Crawford, who held the post of Chief Executive from 1865-1868 inclusively, had very decided opinions, that may be summarized as follows: (1) Every effort should be expended in defending the State from Indians. (2) Indian uprisings should be put down by the use of military force. (3) The wild tribes of Indians should be conquered and driven from the State. (4) Reservation Indians in Eastern Kansas should be removed to Indian Territory. (5) The Indian Bureau should be transferred from the Interior Department to the War Department. (6) Indian traders and agents should not be allowed to sell arms and ammunition to the Indians.

Crawford's successor, Governor Harvey, entertained similar ideas. In his message to the legislature in 1869 Harvey advocated: the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department; that Congress be urged to indemnify frontier settlers out of Indian annuities; that provision be made for the organization of two regiments of volunteer militia for frontier service.

The Kansas State Legislature gave both governors able support in their efforts to obtain frontier protection and removal of the Indians. In January, 1865, a joint resolution passed both houses requesting the War Department to place a sufficient military force in the hands of General

Curtis to enable him to give ample protection to the Kansas frontier and the Overland and Santa Fe routes. The resolution also ordered the Secretary of State to forward a copy of the resolutions to the legislatures of the states of Missouri, Iowa, Nevada, and California, and to the territories of Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Washington and Utah with the view of inducing the legislatures of those states and territories to take similar action. This resolution upon reaching Congress was referred in the Senate to the Committee on Indian Affairs, while in the House it was consigned to the Committee on Military Affairs.

In February, 1865, the Legislature adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. 20 which provided that Congress be urged immediately to order the construction of a telegraph line from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Lyons via Forts Riley, Zarah and Larned. The purpose of the proposed line was to enable United States troops and Kansas Militia to more easily locate and punish Indian hostiles. The resolution further provided that the governor forward copies to the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Interior, and each senator and representative in Congress. The proposed line was not built.

In 1867 the Kansas State Legislature sent several concurrent resolutions to Congress in an effort to obtain greater frontier security. The most prominent of these was a resolution requesting the Kansas delegation in Congress to

urge upon the Government the necessity of promptly establishing a military post or permanent camp between Fort Kearney and Fort Harker. This resolution was tabled in the Senate on February 15, 1867, thus practically killing it.⁴⁷ The request for a military post in this region was quite sensible and should have been granted, since Indian outbreaks occurred more frequently along the Solomon and Republican than in any other section of Kansas except the Smoky Hill Valley.

Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Indian Agent for the Comanche and Kiowa tribes, was especially unpopular with the Kansas legislators; consequently they petitioned Congress for his removal. The complete text of the resolution adopted on February 8, 1867, will best convey the opinion the legislature held concerning Mr. Leavenworth.

"Whereas it has come to the knowledge of the legislature of the State of Kansas that Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, present agent of certain hostile tribes of Indians on the western and southwestern frontier of the State of Kansas, is wholly incompetent to perform the duties thereof; and whereas the settlers on said frontier are in imminent peril of their lives and property through said incompetency; and whereas, unless some competent person be appointed in his stead friendly to the whites, with nerve to meet our present

wants and emergency, our citizens will be butchered, as heretofore in detail;

Therefore,

Resolved by the house of representatives (the senate concurring) That the said Congress, and especially our delegation therein, be earnestly requested to see that said Leavenworth be removed, and a man substituted in his stead who will use his best and honest endeavors, while protecting the interests of the Indians, to
48
save our citizens from slaughter."

Congress failed to heed this petition also, so Mr. Leavenworth continued in office.

The legislative session of 1869 not only sent many appeals to Congress for frontier protection, but passed a large quantity of state laws on the subject. The Kansas delegation in Congress was instructed to use its efforts to secure the passage of an act of Congress to enable the adjustment and payment by the United States of claims of Kansas citizens. The claims in question were for damages inflicted by Arapahoe, Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche Indians
49
in 1864. Another resolution urged Congress and the General Government to make a speedy appropriation for the relief of Kansas citizens who had been victims of Indian depredations
50
from 1861-9. Both of these resolutions were referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs in the Senate but failed to

emerge. Congress was also memorialized to transfer the Indian Bureau to the War Department, Mr. Clarke of Kansas presenting to the House of Representatives the concurrent resolution of the State Legislature.⁵¹

Legislative measures for frontier protection passed during the 1869 session dealt chiefly with the financing of military expeditions of 1868. An act was passed providing for the issuance and sale of \$14,000 in state bonds to defray the expenses incurred by the raising of the Nine-⁵²teenth Kansas Cavalry. Another act of similar nature provided for the issuance of \$75,000 in state bonds for payment of all other military indebtedness of 1868. Especially did this apply to the expenses of raising and maintaining the⁵³ First Frontier Battalion. For future protection of the frontier the legislature ordered that \$100,000 of state⁵⁴ bonds be issued and sold to provide a state military fund.

In the session of 1870 the legislature again sent a memorial to Congress the main points of which were an appeal to the Government to prevent a repetition of the Indian outrages on Kansas settlers and a protest against any reduction⁵⁵ of the United States Army.

In reading through the files of Kansas newspapers for the period, one is impressed by the unmistakable attitude of antagonism which the press maintained toward the Indian, the Indian traders and agents, and the Indian policy of the United States Government. Several representative articles

chosen from a variety of newspapers will indicate what the Kansas papers thought on the Indian question. One editor during the Civil War demanded the complete extermination of the Plains Indians.⁵⁶ Others approved heartily of Colonel Chivington's method of dealing with them.⁵⁷ In 1866 when Major General Cloud was contemplating a campaign against the Indians with Kansas militia, the Junction City Union commented in the following way:

"If the General has any compunctions of conscience in regard to 'playing Sand Creek' upon them (the Indians) he had better not start. It is so unfortunate for the settlements that so many asses have existed as to make such a tremendous howl, in the interests of thieving agents, because of the Sand Creek whipping.

Had the effect of that not been spoiled, Indians⁵⁸ would have been effectually subdued for years."

Following some sarcastic comments about Indians indulging in their "little innocent pastime of scalping" another editor took a hard crack at the United States military posts. The posts, he declared, were of no protection whatever to travelers or settlers and that "The only purpose subserved by these ornamental appendages to the Government seems to be the consumption of poor commissary whiskey."⁵⁹

Epithets applied to the Indians by newspapers were numerous. They varied from the slightly sarcastic references

to "the noble red man" and "Lo, the Poor Indian" to the more emphatic appellations of "red devils" "hell hounds", and "sons of the Devil". Even the reservation Indians in the eastern part of the State were not exempt. A very amusing yet contemptuous opinion of the Kaw Indians is reproduced below.

"We have not seen the dusky forms of the noble red men of the Kaw persuasun about our streets in the last two or three days. Doubtless those sweet scented ones that were encamped near here have gone back to their reservation. When we consider how efficient they were in 'gobbling up' the putrescent animal and vegetable matter about the city, we almost regret their departure.

Now that these scavengers are gone, our city fathers should look to it that some other means be employed to guard the health of our
 60
 people."

Occasionally a Kansas paper took the part of the Indian. The Kansas State Record in 1868 deplored the fact that people persisted in getting up rumors of an Indian war when there was no occasion for it. The editor admitted that more than half of the Indian outrages were caused in the first
 61
 place by wrongs done to the Indian by the white man. The same editor later in the year denied that the majority of
 62
 Indian wars were caused by the whites. Then a few days

later, after riding on a train in the company of Colonel Wyncoop, Indian agent at Fort Larned, the editor published an article in which he coincided with Wyncoop's views. Wyncoop had said that the military never punish the guilty Indians but wreak their vengeance on the innocent; also that every treaty made by the United States with the Indians was first broken by the whites.

63

Indian agents received their share of abuse at the hands of the press. Colonel Leavenworth, of course, was the principal target at which these literary shafts were aimed. A newspaper correspondent writing from Fort Harker on July 10, 1867, handed the following bouquet to the Colonel:

" . . . the Indians evidently having either gone North; or to the vicinity of Colonel Leavenworth's headquarters, there to receive those presents that tender hearted functionary has recently obtained from the Government for distribution among the Lo family. It is the earnest wish of every person in this section, so far as I can ascertain, that the Indians immediately after receiving their presents from Leavenworth, will return the compliment by lifting his hair."

64

The Junction City Union, in speaking of John Smith, an Indian trader, was almost incoherent with rage because the said Smith hobnobbed with Congressional committees, professed

horror at any proposal to punish the Indians, yet grew rich by stealing from both the Government and Indians. The article advised the Government to get rid of its thieving agents, interpreters and hangers-on if it intended to solve⁶⁵ the Indian question.

Kansas editors especially resented the attitude of the eastern press toward the people of their state. A common accusation of eastern newspapers was that the people of Kansas desired an Indian War for the sake of the contracts and profits which would accrue to the locality in which military expeditions were organized and outfitted. This was⁶⁶ constantly denied with vehemence by the Kansas press. When a St. Louis paper, The Missouri Republican, quoted General Sherman as saying that parties in Kansas wanted an Indian war, the Leavenworth Conservative immediately published a statement which not only denied the truth of the accusation⁶⁷ but doubted that Sherman ever said it. Following the Saline-Solomon raids of 1868 a Topeka journal expressed the views of Kansas in these words:

"We hope that Easterners will learn that Kansas citizens are not thieves, constantly striving for an Indian war for the purpose of speculation; but that the frontier settlers are constantly in the presence of a great danger so long as the Indians are permitted to remain in or come into⁶⁸ the state."

Kansas in general ridiculed the easterner's ideas on the Indian question. "Maudlin sentimentalists"--"Eastern philanthropists"--"Indian Worshipers" and other similar epithets were hurled back at those people in the East who advanced solutions for the great racial problem. An eastern proposal to withdraw troops from the Plains in the fall of 1865 was regarded as absurd.⁶⁹ Horace Greeley's plan for putting the Indian to work raising cattle and sheep on the Plains was hailed with glee by a quick-witted Kansas editor who observed that it was about as practical as going to the moon in a balloon.⁷⁰

Whenever the Indian Bureau received mention in a Kansas paper it was only in the most scathing terms. The Leavenworth Daily Conservative at one time described the "Indian Office" as being nothing but a great buying and selling agency which paid tribute to barbarism to compensate for damages done by civilization.⁷¹ The same paper again alluded to the bureau as a reproach and a disgrace to the nation and stated that the country looked upon it as a den of robbers.⁷² The Conservative had previously adhered to the belief that the Indian Bureau should be transferred to the War Department, but in 1867, when a suggestion had been made in Washington to make the bureau an independent department, the Leavenworth paper approved. Especially did the Conservative welcome that part of the new plan which proposed consigning the wild Indians to the War Department while the Indian

Department supervised the civilized tribes. "By all odds let the War Department have the uncivilized Indians," it
⁷³
 shouted.

When the Indian Bureau in 1868 declared that Kansans were greatly exaggerating reports of Indian raids the Kansas State Record rose in anger and wrathfully retorted:

"The Indian Bureau will believe nothing 'till they obtain, through miles of red tape a month later, an official report. We only hope that Governor Crawford will put himself at the head of a band of our Western men, follow the Indians to their homes, and do his work a la Chivington. If he does he must be sure to keep out of the way of the U. S. officials; or, if necessary,
⁷⁴
 fight them."

Upon hearing of the Senate confirmation of Mr. Bogy as Commissioner of Indian Affairs the Junction City Union vented its opinion of the man. Among other things he was referred to as "one of the most skulking and cowardly rebels of all wretches of the class who ever cursed Missouri with the evil
⁷⁵
 of their wicked lives".

The Kansas press was especially belligerent toward the peace party in Congress who endeavored to settle the Indian troubles by treaty instead of by force. The Kansas Daily Tribune advocated a short residence upon the Plains with the

loss of a scalp as a sure cure for the romantic ideas which United States Senators and Congressmen had formed in regard to "the dirty red devils". The White Cloud Chief, in reference to General Connor's destruction of an Arapahoe village, feared that Connor would "go overboard", since a "sniffling Congressional Investigating Committee will shortly be after him to examine into and report upon this fiendish piece of barbarism".⁷⁶

While a special session of Congress in the summer of 1867 debated the question of sending a peace commission to the Plains, the newspapers in Kansas were ridiculing its efforts. The way to make peace, according to one editor, was by notifying the Indians that no more treaties would be made and then removing the red men to reservations.⁷⁷

Throughout the period spent by the Peace Commission in Kansas in 1867, the Leavenworth Conservative printed sarcastic articles most of which applied the term "Full Moon Exercises" to the Treaty of Medicine Lodge.⁷⁸

Miscellaneous remarks of Kansas papers are worthy of note. The report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes was met by a storm of protest. The Atchison Daily Free Press thought the report would "wonderfully please the worshippers of the noble red man in the east", but doubted if it would find favor with the frontier people who were acquainted with the facts in the case.⁷⁹ The Junction City Union once went so far as to

declare that all treaty makers should be killed by Indians.

To sum up the attitude of the newspapers of Kansas a representative selection is quoted from one of the leading journals:

"With our routes of travel closed; with our borders beleaguered by thousands of these merciless devils whose natures are compounded of every essential diabolism of hell . . . we present to the civilized world a picture of weakness and vacillation, deliberately sacrificing men and women, one of whose lives is worth more than the existence of all the Indians in America."⁸¹

Lest it be thought that a few newspaper editors were dictating the thinking of the people of Kansas, it is well to cite opinions of the frontiersmen themselves. Citizens of Marion County first circulated a petition for the removal of Colonel Leavenworth. The petition was then endorsed by Governor Crawford and sent to the Secretary of the Interior.⁸² Opinions expressed by the frontiersmen concerning the Indians and Indian policy, while less polished, were just as forceful as those of newspaper editors. One illiterate frontiersman, in writing to Governor Crawford, made reference to the "read devvels". Others thought that the Government was in league with the Indians to destroy the settlers.⁸³ The majority of the letters sent to the Kansas governors

expressed hatred and fear of the Indians, horror at the Indian Bureau's policy of arming the red men, and disgust at the peace-treaty-making, present-giving system employed by the Government.

Another expression of the people's attitude was the resolution adopted by the Republican State Convention at Topeka on September 9, 1868.

"We demand, in the name of our frontier settlers, that the uncivilized Indians be driven from the State, and the civilized tribes be speedily removed to the Indian country."

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Raymond L. Welty, "The Army Fort of the Frontier",
North Dakota Historical Quarterly, v. ii, No. 3, p. 155
2. Ibid., 156-157.
3. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), June 19, 1868.
4. Elvid Hunt, History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1927.
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The General Service School's
Press, 1926), 97. Hereafter cited as Hunt, History of
Fort Leavenworth.
5. Ibid., 97.
6. Telegram from General Robert B. Mitchell to Governor
Samuel J. Crawford, May 12, 1865, Correspondence of
Kansas Governors, Crawford (Telegrams), 6, Archives,
Kansas State Historical Society. Hereafter cited C. K.
G., Crawford, (Telegrams). (The various forms of this
series of correspondence will hereafter be cited C. K.
G.) Mitchell, commander at Fort Leavenworth, stated
that Colonel Blair of Fort Scott was under orders to
look after the eastern border of Kansas as far north as
the Kaw River.
7. Hunt, History of Fort Leavenworth, p. 93.
8. Report of the Secretary of War, 1868, 40th Cong., 2d
sess., House Ex. Docs., v. ii, No. 1, part 1, p. 39.

9. Letter of Governor James M. Harvey to General John Pope, February 2, 1872, C. K. G., Harvey (Letter press books), v. 1, pp. 101-102.
10. Landmarks, Barton County (a typewritten collection of notes and manuscripts dealing with the historical landmarks of Kansas, compiled by the library of the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka). Hereafter cited as Landmarks, with or without county name following.
11. W. F. Pride, The History of Fort Riley (n. p., n. pub., c. 1926), p. 148.
12. List of military forts, arsenals, camps, and barracks, T. H. S. Hamersly, Complete Army and Navy Register, (New York, T. H. S. Hamersly, publisher, 1888), 162. Hereafter cited as Hamersly.
13. G. D. Bradley, "Famous Landmarks Along the Trail," Santa Fe Employees Magazine, v. vi, No. 11, p. p. 41-42
14. Letter of May 2, 1924, from Joseph R. Wilson to William E. Connelley, secretary of the Kansas State Historical Society, Landmarks.
15. Ibid.
16. Hamersly, p. 136. With the construction of the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, through the Kaw and Smoky Hill valleys in 1866 and 1867, much of the Santa Fe traffic shifted north to the railroad. Travelers to Santa Fe took the railroad to "End of Track", where the stage made connections. From there they went by way of the Fort Harker--Fort Larned military trail to its

junction with the Santa Fe Trail at the latter place.

17. William A. Bell, New Tracks in North America (Second Edition, London, Chapman, and Hall; New York, Scribner, Welford and Co., 1870), pp. 27-28.
18. The Republican Journal (Salina), January 31, 1902, referred to Fort Harker as the strongest post on the Plains in 1868. Perhaps local pride entered into the statement.
19. Senate Miscellaneous Documents, p. 76, 41st Cong., 2d sess.
20. J. H. Beach, "Fort Hays", Kansas Historical Collections, v. xi, p. 571.
21. Ibid., p. 574.
22. Mrs. Frank C. Montgomery, "Fort Wallace and Its Relation to the Frontier", Kansas Historical Collections, v. xvii, p. 189. Hereafter cited as Mrs. Montgomery, Fort Wallace.
23. Ibid., p. 203.
24. Ibid.
25. Landmarks.
26. H. Harlan, Trego County Clippings, p. 76. (A series of unbound newspaper clippings in the library of the Kansas State Historical Society); Landmarks, Trego County. The first of these references gives 1865 as the date for the founding of Fort Downer, while the second says 1867; Hamersly states that the fort was established May 30, 1867, p. 131, List of Forts; see also Kansas

Historical Collections, v. ix, p. 573.

27. Landmarks, Trego County.
28. Mrs. Frank C. Montgomery, Fort Wallace, p. 198.
29. Ogallah should not be called a fort. It was never more than a railroad construction camp, although used for defense against Indians by construction gangs. Kansas Historical Collections, v. xvii, p. 228.
30. Trego County Clippings, p. 78.
31. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), June 12, 1868.
32. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), June 12, 1868. A news item reprinted from the Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) mentioned that "A company of United States infantry and eighty-four volunteers are stationed at Wichita at present and will probably remain there during the winter."
33. Z. T. Walrond, Annals of Osborne County, Kansas, 1870-1879. (A bound volume of clippings in the library of the Kansas State Historical Society), p. 21.
34. Kansas State Historical Society, Twenty-fifth Biennial Report, 1925-1926, pp. 74-75.
35. Greenwood County Clippings, v. i, p. 15.
36. Clay Center Times, January 12, 1922.
37. Landmarks, Ottawa County.
38. Landmarks, Republic County.
39. Letter from a settler in Ottawa County, Kansas, to Governor Samuel J. Crawford, September 23, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford (Incoming Letters).

40. Telegram from Adjutant General John P. Sherburne of Fort Leavenworth to Governor Samuel J. Crawford, July 20, 1866, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 28. Sherburne informed the Governor that one company of cavalry from Fort Kearney and Fort McPherson was scouting in the region of the Little Blue River.
41. Frank A. Root and William E. Connelley, The Overland Stage to California, (Topeka, Kansas, published by the authors, 1901), p. 242. Hereafter cited as Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage.
42. Ibid., p. 490
43. Julius Sterling Morton, Illustrated History of Nebraska (In two volumes, Lincoln, Jacob North and Co., 1905, 1906), v. ii, p. 168.
44. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, p. 342.
45. For an interesting and colorful history of Bent's Fort see George Bird Grinnell, "Bent's Old Fort and Its Builders", Kansas Historical Collections, v. xv, pp. 28-88.
46. W. A. Bell, New Tracks in North America, p. 28.
47. Report of the Secretary of War, 1868, 40th Cong., 2d sess., p. 39. House Ex Docs., v. ii, No. 1, part 1.
48. Ibid., p. 40.
49. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), March 4, 1864.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Much evidence to support this statement is found in the Eastern Kansas newspapers of 1866 and 1867.
2. Telegram from Governor Samuel J. Crawford to Major General Reynolds, October 2, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 146. Crawford had instructed Reynolds, who was in Austin, Texas, to get Quantrill if at all possible, stating that the Kansas State Legislature would pay a large sum for him. Crawford personally guaranteed a reward of \$1,000 for his arrest and delivery at Lawrence.
3. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864, Kansas. (A loose collection of incoming and outgoing letters arranged in bundles according to the year. Archives, Kansas State Historical Society). Hereafter cited as Adjutant General's Correspondence (Kansas) followed by the year.
4. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), June 4, 1864.
5. Ibid., July 28, 1864.
6. Samuel J. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, (Chicago, A. C. McCluy and Co., 1911), p. 146. Hereafter cited as Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties.
7. A series of editorials in the Tribune begun in February

and continued at intervals over a period of several months.

8. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 123.
9. Ibid., p. 124.
10. A careful perusal of Governor Crawford's incoming telegrams and letters did not reveal any answers to the two telegrams cited.
11. Published in the Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence).
12. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 15. (A bound volume of copies of outgoing letters, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society). Hereafter cited as above.
13. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 17.
14. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 26. Letter dated February 28, 1866.
15. Ibid.
16. On June 5, Crawford asked Mayor Lykins of Lawrence if he needed the troops longer. Lykins replied the next day assuring Crawford that the troops were needed since the bushwhacker was not tried during that term of court.
17. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 27.
18. Ibid., p. 26. Apparently a telegram was placed by mistake in the copy book. Crawford in the letter to Ross had mentioned his telegram to Pope.
19. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 41.
20. Ibid., p. 19.
21. General Dodge's orders in this respect must have been changed later, since there is definite proof that the

troops were sent afterwards to Lawrence.

22. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 29.

23. Letter from a citizen of Oswego, Kansas, to Governor Crawford, December 17, 1866, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1866, (Kansas). Permission was asked of the Governor to organize a regiment of militia for home protection. The writer referred to the fact that the militia on the Cherokee Neutral Lands had been ordered to muster.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. Kansas newspaper files for the Civil War period verify this statement.
2. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 223.
3. A good account of the activities of the Bent brothers is given by George Bird Grinnell in The Fighting Cheyennes. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.) Hereafter cited as Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes.
4. Indian Depredations and Battles, Clippings, I, pp. 27-31, Kansas State Historical Society. (Reprint from the address of W. L. Bartles of Iola before the Society, December 2, 1902.)
5. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 144.
6. Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs 1864, pp. 236-237.
7. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 131.
8. Ibid., p. 134.
9. Ibid., p. 140
10. Ibid., p. 147.
11. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, p. 229
12. Ibid., p. 23; pp. 218-219.
13. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), July 27, 1864.

14. Ibid., August 7, 1864. (Reprint from the Leavenworth Conservative.)
15. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864, (Kansas).
Major Pollard, commander of the Eighth Regiment K. S. M. Had previously urged Governor Carney to let the regiment assist Curtis. Pollard to Carney, July 24th.
16. Kansas Daily Tribune, (Lawrence). August 7, 1864. A reprint from the Leavenworth Conservative.
17. Kansas Daily Tribune, August 10th.
18. Ibid., August 23rd. Reprint from Marysville, (Kansas) Enterprise.
19. Ibid., August 24th. Reprint from Leavenworth Conservative.
20. Letter from general superintendent of the Overland Mail Line to the Honorable Wm. P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 31, 1864, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, p. 254.
21. Ibid., p. 255.
22. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 148.
23. Senate Report Number 156, Appendix, 39 Cong., 2 sess., p. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 47.
25. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, p. 256
26. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864. (Kansas)
27. Price to Holliday, October 31, 1864, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864.
28. Even George Bird Grinnell, who presents the Cheyenne

side of the story, admits that most of the Indians in the tribe were hostile. He states that the old men were for peace, while the young men were all for war, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 152; for Governor Evan's side of the case see Senate Report 156, Appendix, pp. 43-9, 39 Cong., 2 sess.

29. Black Kettle and other chiefs to Major Colley, August 29, 1864, Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 152.
30. Kansas Historical Collections, VII, p. 67, footnote. Chivington in his report stated that over five hundred were killed, while George Bent estimated one hundred fifty.
31. Numerous testimonials given before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War agree on this statement.
32. Senate and House Proceedings 1865, Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., 2 sess., p. 254, p. 1336.
33. Senate Debate 1866, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess., 3506
34. Official copy of the original treaty. Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. (Located in vault in box labelled Plains Indians.)
35. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 161.
36. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, p. 222
37. See issue of August 20, 1864.
38. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, pp. 353-356.
39. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess.
(Debate on the Ross Amendment to S. 136), pp. 708-9.

40. Ibid., p. 708.
41. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) January 15, 1865.
42. Ibid. February 2, 1865. Report of General Mitchell to General Curtis January 29.
43. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), May 2, 1865.
44. Junction City (Kansas) Union, August 19, 1865.
45. House Journal, Kansas Legislature 1865, pp. 88-9.
46. Ante, p. 19; p. 20.
47. House Journal, Kansas Legislature 1865, p. 168.
48. Colonel Ford's order was published in the Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) May 11, 1865.
49. Ibid.
50. Ante, p. 7; p. 8.
51. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, p. 395.
52. Ante, p. 2.
53. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, pp. 400-401.
54. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 224.
55. C. F., p. 43.
56. Editorial, Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), May 2, 1865.
57. Crawford to Curtis, February 7, 1865, C. K. G. Crawford, (Letterpress Books), p. 28; Crawford to Dodge, February 11, 1865, C. K. G. Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 4; p. 5.
Archives Kansas State Historical Society.
58. Crawford to Sheridan, August 12, 1865, C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 13.
59. Crawford to Grant, August 29, 1865, C. K. G., Crawford, (Letterpress Books), p. 53.

60. Will C. Ferril, "The Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry In the Black Hills in 1865," Kansas Historical Collections, XVII, p. 855.
61. Official Military History of Kansas Regiments, pp. 338-9, Library of the Kansas State Historical Society, n. d., n. p.
62. Ibid., p. 342.
63. Official Military History of Kansas Regiments, p. 342.
64. Wilder, D. W. Annals of Kansas, p. 381. Hereafter cited as Wilder, Annals of Kansas.
65. Junction City (Kansas) Union, October 28, 1865; Daily Kansas Tribune (Lawrence) October 26, 1865.
66. Junction City Union, October 28, 1865.
67. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) September 14, 1865.
68. Official Copy of the Original Treaty, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.
69. Ibid.
70. c. f. previous reference to Article 6 of the treaty.
71. Official Copy of Original Treaty, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.
72. Editorial in Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) October 5, 1865.
73. Report of the Central Superintendency, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1865, p. 46.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), December 12, 1865.
2. Report of Major General Cloud, K. S. M., Adjutant General's Report 1866, (Kansas), p. 3.
3. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 231-232.
4. Major Cloud's Report, p. 4.
5. Crawford to Hancock, August 30, 1866, Correspondence of Kansas Governors, Crawford, (Copy book), p. 39.
6. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 231.
7. Ante., p. 43; p. 44.
8. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, p. 47.
9. Ibid., p. 55.
10. Ibid., p. 310; Junction City (Kansas) Union, March 10, 1866.
11. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, p. 100.
12. Governor Crawford's annual message, 1867, Senate Journal, Kansas Legislature 1867, p. 35.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 36.
15. Ibid., p. 37.
16. General W. F. Cloud to T. J. Anderson, Adjutant General, July 5, 1866, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1866 (Kansas).

17. Major General W. F. Cloud's Report, Adjutant General's Report, 1866, p. 5.
18. News item, Junction City (Kansas) Union, August 25, 1866
19. Governor Crawford's annual message, 1867, pp. 37-38.
 Liquor traffic already was prohibited by federal law in the Indian country, which included the unorganized counties of Kansas. The law was not being well enforced, however. Crawford felt that enforcement could best be accomplished by state law. He adopted the theory that the state government held jurisdiction over the entire area of the state whether organized into counties or not. In taking this position he differed sharply with the commander at Fort Harker, who held that the Federal Government alone had jurisdiction over the region.
20. House Journal, Kansas Legislature, 1867, p. 929.
21. Letter to John Sherman, October 20, 1866, The Sherman Letters, (Correspondence between General W. T. Sherman and Senator John Sherman from 1837 to 1891. Edited by Rachael Sherman Thorndike. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), p. 277. Hereafter cited as The Sherman Letters.
22. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 251.
23. William E. Connelley, "The Treaty Held at Medicine Lodge", Kansas Historical Collections, XVII, pp. 601-606
 Hereafter cited as Connelley, Medicine Lodge Treaty.
24. The narrative of Hancock's War is taken from Mr. Connelley's article.

25. Connelley, Medicine Lodge Treaty, p. 603.
26. For a criticism of Hancock's judgment see Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 239.
27. Letter from B. Marshall to Colonel John B. Anderson, September 18, 1867, The John B. Anderson Papers, Personal correspondence of Colonel John B. Anderson, prominent eastern financier, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. Hereafter cited as The John B. Anderson Papers.
28. Ante., p. 51.
29. Dispatch from Denver, April 22, in Junction City Union, April 27, 1867.
30. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), pp. 42-43.
31. Ibid., p. 43.
32. Ibid., p. 134.
33. Ibid., p. 37.
34. Crawford to Stanton, June 22, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 133.
35. Crawford to Stanton, June 24, 1867, Ibid., p. 133.
36. Crawford to Commanding Officer at Fort Leavenworth, June 24, 1867, Ibid., p. 135.
37. Adjutant General McKeever to Governor Crawford, June 24, 1867, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1867, (Kansas).
38. Crawford to Haskell, June 24, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 134.
39. Ibid.
40. C. F., p. 52.
41. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 256.

42. Sherman to Crawford, June 26, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 43.
43. General S. J. Smith to Governor Crawford, June 27 and 28, 1867. Ibid., p. 44
44. Crawford to Sherman, June 28, 1867, Ibid., p. 44.
45. Sherman to Crawford, July 1, 1867, Ibid., p. 45.
46. Letter from Sherman to Dodge, January 16, 1867, Grenville M. Dodge, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman, (Council Bluffs, Iowa, The Monarch Printing Co., 1914) p. 196. Hereafter cited as Dodge, Personal Recollections. Sherman had referred to the Indian wars as follows: "I want to punish and subdue the Indians, who are the enemies of our race and progress, but even in that it is well sometimes to proceed with due deliberation."
47. Letter to Senator John Sherman, September 28, 1867, The Sherman Letters, p. 296. In reference to Senator Henderson's theory that Congress had not intended to furnish governmental protection to transportation companies, Sherman emphatically stated that he, himself, had always acted upon the theory that when Congress located a road it amounted to a promise to protect that road.
48. Sherman to Dodge, May 27, 1867, Dodge, Personal Recollections, pp. 200-201.
49. Ibid.
50. Sherman to Crawford, June 24, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford,

(Telegrams), p. 50.

51. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 10, 1867.
52. Sherman's assertion that high water was the chief cause for the delay in railroad construction is substantiated by the fact that the bridges all along the Union Pacific Eastern Division (Kansas Pacific) were built too low thus inviting destruction of the road bed by floods. Statement of B. Marshall to Colonel John B. Anderson, September 18, 1867, The John B. Anderson Papers.
53. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 47.
54. Sherman to Crawford, July 10, 1867, Ibid., p. 48.
55. Leroy R. Hafen, The Overland Mail 1849-1869, (The Arthur H. Clark Company, Cleveland, 1926), p. 319.
56. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess., p. 688.
57. House Ex. Doc. No. 1, 40 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 4-5.
58. Ibid., p. 5.
59. Printed in the Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 10-11, 1867.
60. Senate Debate, 1867, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess., p. 688.
61. Ante., p. 64.
62. Letter to Senator Sherman, July 16, 1867 (written from Fort Harker, Kansas.) The Sherman Letters, p. 290.
63. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 10, 1867.
64. Reprint of Sherman's letter of July 19 to the St. Louis Republican, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 23, 1867.

65. Ibid.
66. B. Marshall to Colonel John B. Anderson, Sept. 18, 1867,
The John B. Anderson Papers.
67. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 47; p. 136.
68. Ibid., p. 48.
69. Ibid., p. 69. (The italics are mine)
70. Crawford's instructions to Colonel Moonlight of Leavenworth, July 5, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 136.
71. Crawford's instructions to Colonel John A. Martin of Atchison, July 8, Ibid.
72. Wilder, Annals of Kansas (Annals for July 15, 1867).
73. Annual Report of the Military Division of the Missouri, October 1, 1867, Report of Secretary of War, 40 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 34-5.
74. "The Battle of Beaver Creek," George B. Jenness, Kansas Historical Collections, IX, pp. 443-452.
75. General Hancock's report to Governor Crawford, August 24, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), pp. 38-39.
76. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 261.
77. Wilder, Annals of Kansas, p. 468.
78. Letter from news correspondent in Denver, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 25, 1867.
79. Reprint from Junction City Union by Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 25, 1867.
80. Reprint from the Denver News of July 27, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, August 4, 1867.
81. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 27, 1867.

82. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 280.
83. Crawford to Sherman, August 5, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 138.
84. Sherman's Annual Report, Report of the Secretary of War, 40 Cong., 2 sess., p. 37.
85. Sherman to Hancock, August 16, 1867, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1867, (Kansas).
86. Letter to Crawford, August 28, 1867, Ibid.
87. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 34.
88. Ibid., p. 138.
89. Ibid., p. 138. The two telegrams are similar in content, the first having been directed to Sherman at Omaha, while the second was sent the following day to St. Louis; Crawford apparently wanted to make sure that Sherman would get the message immediately.
90. Ibid., p. 40.
91. Letter to Colonel John B. Anderson, The John B. Anderson Papers.
92. Telegram to Crawford, August 10, 1867, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 38.
93. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, August 11, 1867.
94. Letter to J. R. Mead, an Indian trader, Sept. 4, 1867. C. K. G., Crawford, (Outgoing Letters), p. 57.
95. The Sherman Letters, p. 296.
96. Connelley, Medicine Lodge Treaty, pp. 603-604.
97. Connelley says 5,000. Crawford estimated the total number of warriors at 3000. This would mean a total

- population of approximately 7,500.
98. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 277.
 99. Terms of the Medicine Lodge Treaty derived from:
 Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 284; Crawford,
 Kansas In the Sixties, p. 278; Charles J. Kappler,
 Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties, II, p. 764.
 100. Connelley, Medicine Lodge Treaty, pp. 604-605.
 101. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 266.
 102. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 282.
 103. Letter from Thomas Lovewell to Governor Crawford,
 December 23, 1867, Adjutant General's Correspondence,
 1867, (Kansas).
 104. James A. Hadley, "The Death of Lieutenant Kidder",
 Indian Depredations and Battles, Clippings, I, p. 64,
 Kansas State Historical Society.
 105. Report of the Secretary of War 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess.,
 p. 45. Part I, House Ex. Doc., Vol. II, No. 1.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 287.
2. C. C. Rister, The Southwestern Frontier, p. 106.
3. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 288.
4. Sherman to Hancock, January 26, 1867, House Miscellaneous Document No. 40, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
5. Grant to Stanton, February 1, 1867, Ibid.
6. House Miscellaneous Document No. 41, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
7. This letter was enclosed by Sherman to Grant. House Miscellaneous Document No. 40, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
8. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 249-250.
9. Ibid., p. 251.
10. Editorial, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, October 29, 1867.
11. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), pp. 54-57.
12. Bulletin from Cottonwood Falls, June 3, 1868, Kansas State Record (Topeka), issue of June 6, 1868.
13. Kansas State Record, June 7, 1868.
14. Ibid., editorial.
15. Sheridan to Crawford, June 5, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 75.
16. Sheridan to Ward Burlingame, June 8, 1868, Ibid., p. 76.
17. Daily Kansas State Record, June 12, 1868.

18. Sheridan to Crawford, May 27, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 73.
19. Telegram, Sheridan to Crawford, cited by the Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka), June 20, 1868.
20. Letter from the War Department to Senator E. G. Ross of Kansas, June 19, 1868, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1868, (Kansas).
21. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), July 21, 1868.
22. Atchison Daily Free Press, July 27, 1868.
23. Ibid.
24. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 289; Rister, The Southwestern Frontier, p. 107; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1868, p. 70. Major Wyncoop, Indian agent at Fort Larned, has stated that the arms were delivered on August 9. Furthermore, he asserted that the war party which committed the Saline-Solomon outrages left Fort Larned before the arms were issued. Not knowing of the issue, they were angry because the Government had not given them their promised weapons.
25. Atchison Daily Free Press, August 5, 1868.
26. Testimony of Edmund Guerriere, a half breed Cheyenne, Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 47
27. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), August 15-19, 1868.
28. Ibid.
29. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 290.
30. Ibid.
31. Adjutant General's Report 1868 (Kansas), p. 7; Daily

Kansas State Record (Topeka), August 19, 1868.

32. Sheridan to Crawford, August 21, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 69.
33. Ante., p. 82.
34. Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka), October 8, 1868.
35. Ibid., August 26, 1868.
36. Ibid., September 8, 1868.
37. Ibid., September 10, 1868.
38. News dispatch from Denver, August 29, 1868, Daily Kansas State Record, August 29.
39. Mrs. Montgomery, Fort Wallace, p. 234.
40. Winfield Freeman, "The Battle of the Arickaree", Kansas Historical Collections, VI, p. 347.
41. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 295-296.
42. Forsyth to Colonel Bankhead, Commander at Fort Wallace, September 19, 1860. Cited by Mrs. Montgomery in "Fort Wallace and Its Relation to the Frontier".
43. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 294.
44. Indian Depredations and Battles, (Clippings), III, p. 16
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.
45. Topeka Journal, September 8, 1907.
46. The Kinsley Graphic, December 13, 1928.
47. The Fighting Cheyennes, pp. 281-282.
48. Possibly Crawford was influenced by a letter from Major Armes of Sheridan's staff, who secretly informed the Governor that Sheridan was short of regulars and needed the aid of Kansas volunteers. Armes to Crawford,

September 8, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Incoming Letters), Box 14, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.

49. C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 98.
50. Ibid., p. 154.
51. Ibid., p. 97.
52. Ibid., p. 82.
53. Crawford's instructions to recruiting officers, Ibid., p. 149.
54. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), September 16, 1868.
55. Sheridan to Crawford, September 21, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 83.
56. Ibid., p. 84.
57. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1868, (Kansas).
58. Adjutant General's Report 1868, pp. 9-10.
59. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1868, (Kansas).
60. Letter from Post Adjutant Gardner to Colonel McAfee, Ibid.
61. Major Jenness to Colonel McAfee, October 26, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Incoming Letters), Box 14, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.
62. Daily Kansas State Record (Topeka), October 24, 1868; The Times and Conservative, (Leavenworth), October 27, 1868.
63. The Times and Conservative, October 31, 1868.
64. W. T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, September 23, 1868, The Sherman Letters, p. 322.

65. Sheridan to Crawford, October 8, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford, (Telegrams), p. 87.
66. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 318-319.
67. Sheridan to Crawford, October 8, 1868, Op. Cet.
68. Sheridan to Crawford, October 9, 1868, Ibid., p. 88.
69. Governor Crawford's correspondence in the archives of the Kansas State Historical Society contain seventy-four letters from twenty-three different counties, all of which were written by Kansans offering their services in the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry.
70. Crawford responded to a popular demand on the part of the officers and men of the regiment. Many of his personal friends advised him to refuse the position. Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka), November 15, 1868.
71. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, p. 325.
72. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, pp. 307-309; Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 45.
73. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 289.
74. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 314.
75. Ibid., p. 318.
76. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 47
77. House Proceedings 1869, Congressional Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., p. 683.
78. The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 298.
79. Wichita Daily Eagle, March 2, 1893. (It is of interest to know that the writer of this article, J. R. Mead, was the same Indian trader at Wichita who had been accused

in such scathing terms by Governor Crawford of having sold arms and ammunition to hostile Indians. C. F., 86.

80. "Forty Years With the Cheyennes", The Frontier, March, 1906.
81. Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 41 Cong., 2 sess., House Executive Documents III, p. 524.
82. Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 326-328.
83. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 323.
84. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 49
85. Hazen's report to Sherman, June 30, 1869, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1869, p. 390. (On this occasion, Black Kettle and the other chiefs said that they wanted war with Kansas but peace at Fort Cobb, i. e. war in summer and peace in winter.)
86. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, p. 335.
87. News dispatch of Sheridan's report to Sherman, dated January 16, 1869, printed in the Kansas State Record, (Topeka), January 20, 1869.
88. Kansas State Record, December 30, 1868.
89. Ibid.
90. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, II, pp. 344-345; Horace L. Moore, "The Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry", Kansas Historical Collections, VI, pp. 44-47; Crawford, Kansas In the Sixties, pp. 330-335.
91. Horace L. Moore, "The Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry", p. 46.
92. Schofield's report to the Secretary of War, October 23,

- 1869, Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess.
p. 67.
93. Wilder, Annals of Kansas, p. 502.
 94. Schofield's Report, pp. 67-68.
 95. Wilder, Annals of Kansas, pp. 502-503.
 96. Indian History. (A collection of papers contained in box marked Plains Indians. Located in vault, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.)
 97. Adjutant General's Report 1869 (Kansas), p. 7.
 98. George Bird Grinnell, Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion, pp. 196-202.
 99. Schofield's Report, Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 68.
 100. Sully to Harvey, January 18, 1869, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1869, (Kansas).
 101. Kansas State Record, (Topeka), January 20, 1869.
 102. Ibid., February 3, 1869.
 103. Order from McKeever to commander at Fort Leavenworth, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1869, (Kansas).
 104. House Journal, Kansas State Legislature, 1869, pp. 726, 784, 786, 866, 917; Laws of Kansas 1869, p. 169.
 105. Adjutant General's Report 1869 (Kansas), p. 7.
 106. A. T. Andreas, History of Kansas, p. 211.
 107. Governor Harvey to Colonel Moorhouse, June 13, 1869, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1869, (Kansas).
 108. Ward Burlingame to General Pope, May 20, 1870, C. K. G., Harvey, (Copy Book). (Burlingame mentioned the

use of the mounted artillery men in 1869 and wanted Pope to permit their use again in 1870.)

109. S. D. Houston to Governor Harvey, February 19, 1869, C. K. G., Harvey, (Incoming Letters), Box 16, Archives Kansas State Historical Society.
110. Petition of fifty-five settlers of Cowley County, exact date unknown, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1869, (Kansas).
111. Letter from Joe M. Culver, citizen of Montgomery County, Ibid.
112. Laws of Kansas 1869, pp. 201-204.
113. Report of the commission to Governor Harvey, August, 1869, House Miscellaneous Document No. 20, 41 Cong., 2 sess.
114. Sully to Harvey, February 12 and 18, 1869, C. K. G., Harvey, (Incoming Letters), Box 16, Archives.
115. Davis to Harvey, February 25, 1869, Ibid.
116. Laws of Kansas 1869, pp. 262-264.
117. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., House Executive Documents, Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 52-55.

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Chapter VI

1. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1865, p. 4.
2. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1867, p. 292
3. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1868, p. 68
4. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1869, p. 5
5. Senate Debate 1865, Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., 2 sess.,
p. 327.
6. House Proceedings 1865, Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., 2 sess.,
p. 1413.
7. Senate Report No. 156, 39 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1-10.
8. Senate Debate 1866, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess.,
p. 1492.
9. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 sess.,
p. 1720.
10. Ibid., p. 1923.
11. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 sess.,
p. 1712.
12. C. F., pp. 77-80.
13. "Report of the Indian Peace Commission", January 7,
1868, in Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs
1868, pp. 26-50.
14. Senate Debate 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 2 sess.,
p. 1461.

15. Congressional Globe, 40 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 3100, 3174-5, 3183, 3249, 3271, 3279, 3299, 3731.
16. Senate Debate 1866, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 sess., p. 2613.
17. Ibid., pp. 3506-3507, 3552-3559.
18. Supra, p. 118.
19. House Proceedings 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., pp. 17-21.
20. Senate Debate 1868-1869, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., pp. 40-43, 663.
21. House Proceedings 1869, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., 880
22. Senate Debate 1869, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., p. 1378.
23. Senate Journal, 39 Cong., 1 sess., p. 27.
24. Cf., p. 124.
25. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 sess., p. 1624.
26. Senate Debate 1866, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess., p. 1492.
27. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 sess., p. 1720.
28. Ibid., Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 708-709.
29. Senate Debate 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3275.
30. Senate Debate 1869, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., p. 1378.
31. Senate Debate 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess. p. 61.

32. A prominent example was the resolution urging Congress to establish a military post in Northern Kansas, cf., p. 133.
33. Ante., p. 60.
34. Indian Depredations, II, pp. 183-6, Kansas State Historical Society.
35. Cf., p. 40.
36. Speech of the Honorable E. G. Ross in the Senate, July 18, 1867, Collected Speeches and Pamphlets of Kansas Senators and Congressmen, IX.
37. Kansas State Record, Topeka, November 6, 1869.
38. Senator Ross to Governor Harvey including letter of Ross to General Schofield dated Dec. 30, 1869, Adjutant General's Correspondence 1869, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.
39. House Proceedings 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong. 2 sess., p. 1424.
40. Ibid., p. 1631.
41. House Proceedings 1869, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., pp. 881-2.
42. House Proceedings 1868, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess., p. 18.
43. House Journal, Kansas Legislature, 4 sess., 1865, p. 105
44. Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 16, 38 Cong., 2 sess.
45. Journal of the House, 38 Cong., 2 sess., p. 192.
46. House Journal, Kansas Legislature, 4 sess., 1865, pp. 338-9.

47. Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 26, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
48. Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 34, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
49. Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 32, 40 Cong., 3 sess.
50. Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 48, 40 Cong., 3 sess.
51. House Proceedings 1869, Congressional Globe, 40 Cong.,
3 sess., p. 581.
52. Laws of Kansas 1869, pp. 46-8.
53. Ibid., pp. 38-41.
54. Ibid., pp. 42-44.
55. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 23, Senate Journal,
Kansas Legislature, 1870, pp. 122-124, 259.
56. Kansas Daily Tribune, (Lawrence) August 25, 1864.
57. Ibid., December 21, 1865, Reprint from the Denver News.
58. Editorial of August 4, 1866.
59. Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka) July 23, 1868.
60. Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka) June 25, 1868.
61. Daily Kansas State Record June 3, 1868.
62. Ibid., November 22, 1868.
63. Ibid., November 28, 1868.
64. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 12, 1867.
65. Issue of August 19, 1865.
66. Editorial, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 27, 1867
67. Ibid., May 23, 1867.
68. Daily Kansas State Record, (Topeka), August 23, 1865.
69. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), October 20, 1865.
70. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, February 19, 1867.
71. Ibid., July 11, 1867.

72. Ibid., February 13, 1867.
73. Ibid., October 15, 1867.
74. Issue of August 21, 1868.
75. Issue of March 16, 1867.
76. Issue of January 25, 1865.
77. Reprinted in the Kansas Daily Tribune, October 4, 1865.
78. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, July 19, 1867.
79. Issue of January 7, 1868.
80. Issue of August 4, 1866.
81. Leavenworth Daily Conservative, August 11, 1867.
82. C. K. G., Crawford, (Copy Book), p. 45. (Petition endorsed on January 31, 1867).
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